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Oil, Gas, and Mineral Titles: Resolving Perennial 
Problems in the Shale Era 
Laura H. Burney* 
 
“Long before the full frenzy of the boom, you could see its harbingers at the Mountrail 
County courthouse . . . and now it was the hour of the ‘landmen,’ the men and women 
whose job was to dig through courthouse books for the often-tangled history of mineral 
title and surface rights.” 
-North Dakota Went Boom, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 3, 2013. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The “shale revolution” dominates the news today.1  Analysts rank 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University.  Professor Burney has written extensively on oil and gas 
law issues, and is a frequent speaker at energy resources conferences and courses for attorneys and 
other professionals in the industry. She has served as a mediator and arbitrator in oil and gas and 
other disputes, and has worked as an advocate or expert in oil and gas cases in several states. 
 1.  See Talia Buford, Is Exporting Natural Gas a Problem?, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2013, 4:18 
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/abundance-of-natural-gas-more-harm-than-good-
87533.html (“The U.S. is in the midst of a shale revolution, with fracking making accessible deposits 
of gas trapped deep in shale rock that a decade ago were unreachable.”); Jennifer Hiller, A 21st-
Century Oil Boom in the Lone Star State, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Feb. 25, 2013, 6:46 PM), 
http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/A-21st-century-oil-boom-in-the-Lone-Star-State-
4303192.php (claiming shale production will propel oil production in the United States past some 
other OPEC countries); Jennifer Hiller, Study: Shale Gas Boom Will Last Decades, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS (Mar. 1, 2013, 12:57 AM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/Study-
Shale-gas-boom-will-last-decades-4318224.php (mentioning the shale plays in Texas, Louisiana and 
Arkansas); Fracking: 365 Lee County Landowners Don’t Possess Drill Rights, THE FAYETTEVILLE 
OBSERVER (Feb. 18, 2013, 5:26 AM), http://fayobserver.com/articles/2013/02/18/1238011 (stating 
that landowners will not profit “if a statewide moratorium on hydraulic fracturing is lifted”); Vicki 
Vaughan, Texas is On its Way to Being ‘Saudi Texas’, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Feb. 17, 
2013, 8:38 AM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/default/article/Texas-is-on-its-way-to-being-Saudi-
Texas-4284822.php (noting the vast increase in oil production thanks to shale play) [hereinafter 
Vaughan, Saudi Texas].  In addition to dominating the news, shale play stories can be found on 
YouTube and in a theater near you.  See GASLAND (2010), http://www.gaslandthemovie.com 
(providing facts about and behind the documentary); see also PROMISED LAND (2012), available at 
http://focusfeatures.com/promised_land (last visited Aug. 22, 2013) (detailing the storyline of 
PROMISED LAND, a movie about the impact of establishing new natural gas drilling sites in a small 
farming community); PROMISED LAND TRAILER, YOUTUBE (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHQt1NAkhIo (providing a quick preview).  However, not all of 
the news about the shale play is positive.  See Anne C. Mulkern, California: Massive Shale Play 
Predicted to Trigger New ‘Gold Rush’, ENV’T & ENERGY PUBL’G, LLC. (Dec. 5, 2012, 3:08 PM), 
http://www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/12/05/1 (noting that there are environmental 
concerns associated with fracking in California). 
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current shale play booms as bigger than the historic East Texas and 
Spindletop oil discoveries.
2
  Texas boasts record-setting production from 
the Barnett, Haynesville, and Eagle Ford Shale plays.
3
  Prosperity has 
returned to Pennsylvania, site of the first oil well drilled in 1859, and 
continues through the vast Marcellus Shale, which extends through 
several states.
4
  Other states, including Colorado, Montana, and North 
Dakota, share in the shale play success.
5
  The technologies responsible 
for the surge in production from these “tight rock” shale formations, 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal wells, have revived production from 
others, such as the Mississippian Lime formation in Kansas.
6
  In fact, 
                                                          
 2.  Oil output in Texas has doubled since Eagle Ford production began and in November, 
2012, reached 2.139 million barrels a day.  See Vaughan, Saudi Texas, supra note 1.  From January 
10 until January 19, 1901, Spindletop’s Lucas Geyser produced 100,000 barrels of oil per day.  
Robert Wooster and Christine Moor Sanders, Spindletop Oilfield, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE 
(Oct. 6, 2013, 4:25 PM), http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/dos03. See also Vickie 
Vaughan, Eagle Ford Impact Pegged at $25 Billion in 2011, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (May 9, 
2012, 11:38 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Eagle-Ford-impact-
pegged-at-25-billion-in-2011-3546504.php (touting the Eagle Ford shale “as a modern-day 
Spindletop”); see also Chad Watt, Eagle Ford All Grown Up, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2012, 3:12 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2012/10/16/eagle-ford-all-grown-up-2/ (grouping the 
Eagle Ford Shale with the Permian Basin and Bakken field as the top producers in the United 
States).  Recent shale play has also rekindled hopes about Spindletop and untapped reservoirs 
previously unattainable.  Emily Pickrell, Oilmen Hope to Re-tap Fabled Wealth of Spindletop 
Gusher, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Feb. 7, 2013, 8:32 PM), 
http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/Oilmen-hope-to-re-tap-fabled-wealth-of-Spindletop-
4261411.php.  For a brief history of the East Texas Play and Spindletop see DANIEL YERGIN, THE 
PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER 26 (1991). 
 3.  See Vaughan, Saudi Texas, supra note 1 (declaring Texas’s oil production has reached “all-
time record highs”); see also Texas Oil Production Setting Record Numbers, CROSSROADS TODAY 
(July 12, 2013 7:05PM), http://www.crossroadstoday.com/content/news/story/Texas-Oil-Production-
Setting-Record-Numbers/3U1GKAHli0SjYTxDsL9P6Q.cspx (“A new report said Texas is now 
pumping more oil that some countries and a lot of it is thanks [to] the Eagle Ford Shale.”).  
 4.  “The Marcellus Shale is truly enormous, a natural wonder extending from New York to 
Tennessee along a swath of territory larger than Greece.”  Thomas E. Kurth et al., American Law 
and Jurisprudence on Fracking, 58 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 4-1, at § 4.06 (2012).  The Marcellus 
shale spans across parts of Maryland, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.  See Hobart 
King, Marcellus Shale-Appalachian Basin Natural Gas Play, GEOLOGY.COM, 
http://geology.com/articles/marcellus-shale.shtml (mapping the Marcellus shale across various states 
and its varying depths). 
 5.  Louise S. Durham, Shale List Grows, AAPG EXPLORER (July 2012), 
http://www.aapg.org/explorer/2012/07jul/shale_list0712.cfm.  Others are considering whether to join 
the fracking revolution. See Aaron Sankin, California Fracking Lawsuit: Judge Slams Obama 
Administration, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 9, 2013, 6:23 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/09/california-fracking-lawsuit_n_3046838.html (addressing 
potential environmental concerns presented by fracking); see also NEW YORKERS AGAINST 
FRACKING, http://nyagainstfracking.org/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (campaigning against fracking in 
New York and showcasing the various reasons against lifting the moratorium on fracking). 
 6.  John Kemp, Dreaming of Bakken, Kansas Welcomes Oil Drillers, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2013, 
11:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/08/column-kemp-kansas-fracking-
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courthouses across the country have been “packed with landmen looking 
for additional resources.”7 
Along with prosperity, however, drilling booms spawn litigation 
booms as people seek a piece of the profits from the oil and gas pie.
8
  
One source for disputes is the “often-tangled history” of mineral titles.9  
Landmen and other title examiners encounter convoluted transfers 
through deeds and other documents, and must decipher the language 
parties choose and courts’ interpretations of those words. 
As I have written, mineral deeds present a list of perennial 
interpretative problems,
10
 which create uncertainty about ownership 
rights in mineral estates and the proceeds from the sale of oil and gas 
                                                          
idUSL5E9C89J220130108. 
 7.  Jennifer Hiller, Shale Playground in W. Texas, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Jan. 10, 
2013, 11:50 AM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/Shale-playground-in-W-Texas-
4180979.php. 
 8.  See Laura H. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds: The Legacy of the One-
Eighth Royalty and Other Stories, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 2 (2001) (noting nineteenth century oil 
boom that presented title perfection issues) [hereinafter Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty 
Deeds]; see also Review of Emerging Resources: U.S. Shale Gas and Shale Oil Plays, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. 5–6 (July 2011), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/usshalegas/pdf/usshaleplays.pdf (noting that all across the 
United States shale success is popping up); Daniel Gilbert & Kris Maher, Shale Gas Fuels Legal 
Boom: Fights Over Underground Rights Confound Companies, Pennsylvania Landowners, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204505304577003960524923098.html (“The 
natural-gas boom in Pennsylvania is stoking legal battles over who owns gas that was worthless until 
a few years ago but now holds the promise of great wealth.”). 
 9.  Chip Brown, North Dakota Went Boom, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/magazine/north-dakota-went-
boom.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Landmen and other title examiners must “untangle” and trace 
title through deeds, wills and other proceedings affecting transfers of property to locate current 
owners. See Zain Shauk, Keystone XL Work Veers onto Wrong Land, FUEL FIX, (Jan. 28, 2013, 1:46 
PM), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2013/01/28/keystone-xl-plans-take-work-onto-wrong-land/ (describing 
effect of mistakes in determining ownership for Keystone XL pipeline).  That process raises a host 
of title issues not addressed in this article. See, e.g., Capps v. Weflen, 826 N.W.2d 605, 609 (N.D. 
2013) (noting that a myriad documents and statutes affect mineral titles, such as dormant mineral 
acts in some states). 
 10.  See generally Laura H. Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral Conveyances: The Perennial Problems 
(And How to Avoid Them), Paper Delivered at the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Oil & 
Gas Law Short Course (Oct. 25, 2012) (paper on file with the Kansas Law Review) (examining 
interpretive problems presented by mineral deeds and describing the courts’ methods of dealing with 
them) [hereinafter Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral Conveyances]. Mineral titles create problems not 
encountered in typical real property transactions, such as the sale of a home, where “title companies” 
search records and provide detailed information about title issues; in the oil patch the duty to 
interpret mineral titles falls to landmen and oil and gas attorneys who write title opinions. See 
generally Terry E. Hogwood, The Myth of the Cured Title Opinion, 49 ROCKY MTN MIN. L. FOUND. 
J. 345 (2012) (describing steps taken by landmen and title attorneys to cure oil and gas titles). 
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production.
11
  Although the list is long, in this article I address the 
following: (1) deeds with conflicting fractions; (2) the “mineral or 
royalty” question; (3) the application of the common law “rule against 
perpetuities” to non-participating royalties, a common interest in the oil 
patch; (4) the meaning of “minerals”—does it include oil and gas?; 
(5) the executive’s duty to lease; and (6) deed interpretation versus 
“reformation.” 
Recent cases have clarified some issues and complicated others.  
Regarding conflicting fractions, addressed in Part II, Texas cases have 
rejected the controversial “two-grant” doctrine they created in favor of a 
four-corners approach.  As part of this approach, opinions have 
acknowledged but not embraced the “estate misconception.”  The estate 
misconception reflects the legacy of the traditional 1/8 landowner’s lease 
royalty and its effect on drafting and interpreting mineral and royalty 
deeds.
12
 
Determining whether a deed created a mineral or a royalty interest, 
discussed in Part III, has presented a frequent challenge for title 
examiners and courts.  A goal courts should embrace for resolving this 
and other perennial issues is title stability.
13
  Obtaining this goal requires 
interpretative approaches that increase transferability by decreasing 
claims on property rights.
14
  Approaches that focus on extrinsic evidence 
produce case-by-case results and detract from title stability.  Instead, to 
promote this prized policy in the oil patch, courts should strive to view 
                                                          
 11.  Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 2 (noting mineral deed 
interpretation problems). 
 12.  Infra Part II.A.2.b; see also Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant 
Doctrine in Texas Deed Construction, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 87–89 (1993) (outlining the “estate 
misconception” and its effect on drafting deeds) [hereinafter Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth]. 
 13.  See, e.g., Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (ruling prospectively 
only to avoid title confusion based upon previous decisions); accord Rucker v. DeLay, 289 P.3d 
1166, 1173 (Kan. 2012) (overruling the application of the rule against perpetuities in regards to 
interests reserved in the grantor to promote title stability). See also Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. 
Co., 694 P.2d 299, 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (finding the term “minerals” to be unambiguous and 
expansive for policy reasons); Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 40 (1882) (looking to the 
common meaning of “minerals” to determine whether oil and gas was included in a reservation); 1 
EUGENE KUNTZ ET AL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 13.3, at 375–85 (1962) 
(promoting the idea that when there is a general severance of mineral estate, the entire estate should 
be severed to promote stability); JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS OIL AND GAS LAW 
496 (6th ed. 2012) (preferring an expansive definition of “other minerals” because it avoids case-by-
case searches for the parties’ intent, which contributes to title stability). 
 14.  Laura H. Burney, A Pragmatic Approach to Decision Making in the Next Era of Oil and 
Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENVT’L. L. 1, 12 n.36 (1996) (noting that Judge 
Richard Posner and other scholars “have emphasized the effect of clarifying titles to land on 
efficiency”) [hereinafter Burney, A Pragmatic Approach]. 
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deeds as unambiguous and focus on language in the document.
15
  
Consistent with that approach, in resolving the “mineral or royalty” 
question, the “royalty” label often guides and ends courts’ inquiries.  
Other decisions, however, accord a chameleon-like quality to the term, 
allowing its meaning to change if a lease pre-dated the deed.
16
 Because 
this fact-based approach promotes the estate misconception and creates 
title uncertainty, it should be abandoned.
17
  Yet courts addressing this 
and other issues must debate the “precedent problem”: whether decades-
old decisions, even if misguided, should apply to shale era disputes in the 
name of preserving title stability.
18
 
A 2012 Kansas Supreme Court decision faced the problem of 
misguided precedent in Rucker v. DeLay,
19
 discussed in Part III.B.2.  In 
that case, the court departed from its earlier position that non-
participating royalty interests violate the rule against perpetuities.  Yet 
despite recognizing that most jurisdictions view non-participating royalty 
interests—a common interest burdening mineral estates—as vested and 
therefore exempt from rule against perpetuities’ application, the court 
unnecessarily limited its ruling to reserved interests. 
Pennsylvania recently faced the precedent problem regarding the 
meaning of “minerals.”  As explained in Part IV, most jurisdictions view 
that term as including oil and gas.  In Pennsylvania, however, an 1882 
case created the “Dunham rule,” which determined that oil and gas are 
not included in that term.
20
  In a recent case, Butler v. Charles Powers 
Estate,
21
 claimants under an 1881 deed urged the court to reconsider that 
rule when interpreting deeds affecting modern Marcellus production.  
Addressing the need for title stability, writers warned that, “until the 
                                                          
 15.  Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 78–79 (describing steps in deed 
interpretation process). 
 16.  See Melton v. Sneed, 109 P.2d 509, 512–13 (Okla. 1940) (finding that the term “royalty” 
meant “mineral” when grant did not reference a lease); see also Hamilton v. Woll, 823 N.W.2d 754, 
757 (N.D. 2012) (noting influence of Oklahoma decisions regarding the use of the term “royalty” 
when there is a lease on the property). 
 17.  See infra Part III.B for the influence of other factors besides the estate misconception in a 
non-ownership view of mineral estates, such as Oklahoma. 
 18.  One solution to the precedent problem is for courts to overrule misguided precedent and 
apply new rules prospectively only.  See Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102–03 (overruling “surface 
destruction” test for interpretation of phrase “other minerals” from the date of decision onward). But 
see Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 491 (Tex. 2011) (declining to limit ruling 
regarding scope of executive’s duty to prospective effect). 
 19.  289 P.3d 1166 (Kan. 2012). 
 20.  Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36 (1882). 
 21.  29 A.3d 35 (Pa. 2011). 
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issue is resolved, development of the Marcellus shale in Pennsylvania 
may come to a near halt as a result of the concern of oil and gas 
companies that they have obtained leases from the wrong person.”22  
Cognizant of these concerns, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
recognized the significance of public reliance on Dunham and reaffirmed 
it as the rule in that state.
23
  However, in this part, I explain that the 
Butler opinion should have expressly categorized the Dunham rule as a 
rule of property, distinct from a rule of construction, to better promote 
the goal of title stability.
24
 
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court assessed public reliance on 
its prior rulings, a recent Texas Supreme Court opinion fails to address 
that concern.  Part V examines that recent case, Lesley v. Veteran’s Land 
Board,
25
 which addressed the duty owed by an executive—the owner of 
the right to lease—to non-executive mineral owners.  In that case the 
court held that the executive’s duty may arise prior to the execution of a 
lease, contradicting other cases, including one of its own, which had held 
the duty arises only after a lease has been executed.
26
 
Lesley also involved deed reformation versus interpretation, another 
issue affecting mineral titles, examined in Part VI.
27
 The difference is 
significant: when courts engage in deed interpretation, statutes of 
limitations do not apply because they are interpreting, not reforming, the 
language.
28
  However, when parties seek reformation claiming the words 
in the deed do not reflect their intent, their cause of action could be 
barred by limitations.
29
  In Lesley, the court allowed the discovery rule to 
extend the applicable statute, meaning reformation causes of action could 
remain viable for years after a deed was delivered, an approach that 
destabilizes land titles.
30
  Analyzing the Lesley issues and other perennial 
problems discussed below provides guidance for title examiners, 
                                                          
 22.   LOWE, supra note 13, at 509. 
 23.  Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 65 A.3d 885, 897 (Pa. 2013) (noting that Dunham has 
been the “unaltered, unwavering rule of property law” governing real estate transactions in 
Pennsylvania since 1882).  
 24.  See infra Part IV. 
 25.  352 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2011). 
 26.  Id. at 491 (contradicting In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003)). 
 27.  See infra Part VI.B.1–2. 
 28.  See Lesley 352 S.W.3d at 485–86 (stating that while “a suit for reformation of a deed is 
governed by the four year statute of limitations,” the court disagreed with the trial court’s holding 
that the statute of limitations barred the claim to one-fourth of the mineral estate because there was a 
factual issue at the heart of the dispute). 
 29.  Id. (citing Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 943–44 (Tex. 1980)). 
 30.  Id. at 485–68 (finding that the statutes of limitations did not bar the plaintiff’s claim). 
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drafters,
31
 and courts as parties seek their share—real or imagined—of 
profits from oil and gas production in the shale era.
32
 
II. “CONFLICTING FRACTIONS” 
A.  Background 
Property owners face two key decisions when creating, by grant or 
reservation, interests in their subsurface estates: first, whether to create a 
mineral interest or a royalty interest; and second, what the fractional size 
of that interest should be.
33
  This section examines courts’ interpretations 
of the second decision and the lessons those decisions teach regarding 
drafting in the shale era. 
1. Why Conflicting Fractions Were Used and Why They Are Not  
Necessary 
Assume Owner has decided to convey to Grantee an undivided 1/2 
fractional mineral interest, rather than a royalty interest.  Assume also 
that Owner has previously leased his land to Oil Company with a 
                                                          
 31.  Throughout this article I use the term “drafter” and focus primarily on interests created in 
deeds by grant or reservation.  However, the interpretative approaches and drafting advice I discuss 
applies to other documents, such as wills and trusts. 
 32.  Writers often point to the year 2004 as the beginning of the modern shale era, when gas 
prices first boosted production from the Barnett and other shales. See Shale Gas: Applying 
Technology to Solve America’s Energy Challenges 3, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., DEP’T OF 
ENERGY (Mar. 2011), http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-
gas/publications/brochures/Shale_Gas_March_2011.pdf (recounting the timeline for shale plays); 
see also John D. Furlow & John R. Hays, Jr., Disclosure with Protection of Trade Secrets Comes to 
the Hydraulic Fracturing Revolution, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 289, 298 (2012) (“Since 
1997, the growth in U.S. natural gas production and reserves from the shale plays has been 
exponential. In 2000, shale gas production had started to pick up, but at 0.39 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) 
it still represented only 2% of the 19.18 Tcf of natural gas produced domestically that year. In 2010, 
shale gas production had grown to 5.00 TcF or 23% of total U.S. natural gas production.”).   
      Booms understandably cause grantors to regret previous grants, such as the failure to reserve 
minerals in land that is now subject to the shale booms. See, e.g., Kowcheck v. Pittsburgh Terminal 
Realization Corp., No. 2009-4328, 2011 WL 9753960, at *4–5 (Pa. Com. Pl. Civil Div. Nov. 14, 
2011) (arguing that parties saying “oil and gas” does not mean Marcellus gas). “Plaintiffs’ counsel 
writes ‘the Marcellus Shale . . . was not what was intended to be transferred by fee simple back when 
the transfer was originally made in this matter.’” Id. at 4.  The booms ensure that courts will see a 
surge in deed cases involving regret and wishful thinking as well as the perennial issues I address 
below. 
 33.  See White v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967, 976 (Tex. 1948) (determining that the mineral estate 
was not partitionable in kind). Therefore, owners tend to grant or reserve undivided interests in their 
subsurface estates. These undivided interests can be expressed with fractions or percentages.  As 
demonstrated above, conflicting fractions have spawned the most litigation. 
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familiar lease form, which is commonly viewed as creating a fee simple 
determinable estate in the lessee.  That lease is an older version requiring 
the lessee to pay the owner–lessor the traditional, but no longer common, 
1/8 landowner’s royalty.34  This form lease conveys a fee simple 
determinable estate in all, or 8/8, of the mineral estate to Oil Company, 
leaving Owner with a non-possessory future interest, called a possibility 
of reverter, in all, or 8/8, of the mineral estate.
35
  Note that only in the oil 
patch will one find “the whole” defined as 8/8.  As described below, this 
phenomenon and others stem from the legacy of the 1/8 royalty in older 
form leases.
36
 
Today it is clear that Owner’s pre-existing lease has not converted 
Owner’s interest in the mineral estate from an interest in all (8/8) to only 
1/8.
37
  The lease’s royalty clause entitles Owner to a share of the 
proceeds from the sale of the production, but does not reduce the size of 
his possibility of reverter.
38
  Owner owns a non-possessory interest in all 
of the minerals, but he can convey a fractional interest subject to the pre-
existing lease.  To convey the desired undivided 1/2 mineral interest, the 
owner should use “mineral” language and insert the fraction 1/2 in the 
form’s designated space for the fractional interest Owner intends to 
convey.
39
 
2. Why Multiclause Deed Forms Were Used and Why They Are Not 
Necessary 
Another fact is clear today: as a matter of law, Grantee’s 1/2 
                                                          
 34.  See Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 28 (acknowledging 
that leases traditionally convey a 1/8 royalty but  notes that in Brown v. Havard, the language 
conveyed a lesser royalty). 
 35.  Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 460 (Tex. 1998); 1 
ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.09(E), at 3-78 
(2009) (noting that possibility of reverter is vested interest lessor retains after granting a lease); see 
PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS 
TERMS 818 (Aileen M. Sterling et al. eds., 11th ed. 2000) (describing a possibility of reverter as the 
“interest left in a grantor or lessor after a grant of land or minerals subject to a special limitation”). 
 36.  See infra Part II.A.2.b.  
 37.  Laura H. Burney, The Interaction of the Division Order and the Lease Royalty Clause, 28 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 353, 429 (1997) (“[I]t should be considered well-settled in Texas that the oil and 
gas lease vests 8/8ths of the oil and gas in the lessee, not 7/8ths, with the lessor retaining a 
possibility of reverter in 8/8ths.”). 
 38.  Id. (noting that lessor retains a possibility of reverter in all 8/8). 
 39.  For examples of deed forms for accomplishing these goals, see, e.g., 4 ALOYSIUS A. 
LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAND TITLES AND TITLE EXAMINATION § 23.70 (3d ed. 2012); 
6 WILLIAM B. BURFORD, WEST’S TEXAS FORMS: MINERALS, OIL & GAS § 1:3 (4th ed. 2012). 
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undivided ownership in Owner’s mineral estate entitles her to a 
proportionate share of the rents and royalties payable under the terms of 
the pre-existing lease.
40
  Therefore, after the conveyance, Oil Company 
owes 1/2 of the 1/8 landowner’s lease royalty to Owner and the other 1/2 
to Grantee.
41
  That fact, however, eluded early courts. 
a. Development of the “Multiclause” Deed Form 
For example, in Caruthers v. Leonard, the court held that a 
conveyance subject to an existing lease did not entitle the grantee to a 
proportionate share of the rents and royalties payable under that existing 
lease.
42
  In response to that decision, which was later overruled,
43
 a 
notorious deed form with multiple clauses and spaces for fractions 
developed to insure that Grantee received rents and royalties in 
proportion to the fractional mineral interest conveyed.
44
  Specifically, in 
addition to the granting clause, this deed form recited that the 
conveyance is made “subject to” the existing lease and “covers and 
includes” the specified fractional interest of rents and royalties in the 
existing lease.
45
  Another clause provided that the grantee would receive 
the stated fractional interest in rents and royalties payable under future 
leases.
46
  Notably, these additional subject to and future lease clauses 
lacked granting clause language.
47
  The reason for this omission is 
simple: these clauses were inserted not to make additional grants, but to 
clarify that the grantee receives a proportionate amount of rents and 
                                                          
 40.  See, e.g., Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 464 (finding that grantor’s possibility of reverter 
of 1/12 of the mineral interests included a right to royalties under the lease terms); see also Burney, 
Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 14–15 (noting that “the deed effectively 
conveyed all attributes” of the mineral lease, including the right to share royalties). 
 41.  The proportionate reduction clause in typical lease forms allows the lessee to reduce these 
payments proportionately to Owner and Grantee if they have leased 100 percent. See MARTIN & 
KRAMER, supra note 35, at 871–72 (defining “proportionate reduction clause” and noting that the 
purpose of such a clause is to reduce the payments to a lessor to be in proportion to the lessor’s 
interest). 
 42.  254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1923), abrogated by Hager v. Stakes, 294 S.W. 835 
(Tex. 1927); see Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, 86–87 (discussing the legacy of the 
Caruthers decision). 
 43.   See generally Hager, 294 S.W. 835; Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 306 (1943) (noting 
Hager’s overruling of Caruthers). 
 44.  See generally Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 86–90 (outlining the 
development of the multiclause deed form). 
 45.  Id. at 86. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
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royalties under any lease, existing or future.
48
 
Courts eventually corrected the errors of Caruthers.
49
  But the form, 
which should be avoided, exists in formbooks today.
50
  If filled out 
properly, with the same fraction in every clause, it presents no problems 
for title examiners or courts.  Unfortunately, misconceptions among 
laypersons and legal minds have complicated drafting and interpreting 
these deeds.  The primary offender is the “estate misconception.”51 
b. Role of the “Estate Misconception” 
The estate misconception—a legacy of the “usual 1/8th landowner’s 
royalty”—describes the confusion regarding estate ownership after 
leasing property.
52
  In the example above, Owner, under the influence of 
the estate misconception, assumed the lease converted his ownership to 
1/8 in the mineral estate.
53
  Therefore, if Owner intended to convey an 
undivided 1/2 interest, he multiplied that fraction by 1/8 and inserted the 
fraction 1/16 in the deed’s granting clause.  Because of the wording of 
the other post-Caruthers clauses—the subject to and future lease 
clauses—Owner inserted the fraction 1/2 in those spaces, creating a deed 
with conflicting fractions.
54
 
B.  Interpreting Multiclause Deeds with Conflicting Fractions: The Birth 
and Demise of the “Two-Grant” Doctrine 
These multiple fractions created uncertainty for title examiners.  
                                                          
 48.  Id. (noting that this form of deed was in response to correct the holding in Caruthers, 
which found “that when a grantee received an interest in a mineral estate that was already under 
lease, only a reversionary interest passed”). 
 49.  Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 306 (1943) (noting that the court in Hager overruled 
Caruthers). 
 50.  See, e.g., 6 WILLIAM B. BURFORD, WEST’S TEXAS FORMS: MINERALS, OIL & Gas § 1:2 
(4th ed. 2012) (outlining the various clauses included in a mineral deed form and cautioning against 
“coupling with a grant of the minerals the words ‘royalty,’ ‘royalty interest,’ or minerals ‘produced 
and saved’ from the land” to avoid conveying a royalty interest). 
 51.  See Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 460 (Tex. 
1998) (defining “estate misconception” and describing its effect on drafting); Burney, The 
Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 87–89 (reviewing the estate misconception). 
 52.  See Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 15 (explaining that 
lessors sometimes believe that they only own 1/8 interests in the minerals after the lease when in 
actuality they have a possibility of reverter in 8/8). 
 53.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 54.  See Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 86–87 (emphasizing the effect of 
the Caruthers decision on deed forms and noting that grantors wishing to convey a 1/2 mineral 
interest “can do so by simply conveying a 1/2 mineral interest, regardless of an existing lease”). 
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Which fraction represented the size of the interest Owner intended to 
convey?  Or did the deed make multiple grants?  Early cases provided an 
answer: deeds with multiple and conflicting fractions conveyed more 
than one interest.
55
  Writers labeled this interpretative approach the “two-
grant” doctrine.56  In this section, I review the development and demise 
of the two-grant approach to interpreting deeds with conflicting fractions.  
The next section updates a related issue: deed forms with double or 
restated fractions. 
1. Concord Oil Company v. Pennzoil Exploration & Production 
Company 
The two-grant doctrine arose in Texas, where the multiclause deed 
form originated.  Texas courts adopted this interpretative approach for 
multiclause deed forms with conflicting fractions beginning in the 
1940s.
57
  The last supreme court case to address the two-grant doctrine is 
a 1998 opinion, Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Production 
Co.
58
 
In Concord Oil, courts were confronted with this deed: a 1937 
conveyance of a mineral interest with the fraction 1/96 in the granting 
clause and the fraction 1/12 in a subsequent clause.
59
  At the time, the 
grantor owned a 1/12 mineral interest in the property, which was 
burdened by a pre-existing lease providing for a 1/8 landowner’s 
royalty.
60
  Notably, the deed through which the grantor had received his 
1/12 mineral interest a year earlier was the same as the 1937 deed form 
but the fraction 1/12 appeared in both clauses.
61
 
By the 1990s, Pennzoil owned the grantor’s interest, if any, under the 
                                                          
 55.  Some cases viewed these deeds as granting one fraction at delivery of the deed that 
expanded upon expiration of the existing lease.  See, e.g., Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 
467 (Tex. 1991) (noting that, upon termination of the lease, the grantee’s interest “expanded into a 
full one-half [mineral interest] by operation of law”); see also Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, 
supra note 12, at 92–94 (discussing the “expansion facet” and related decisions, including Jupiter 
Oil). 
 56.  See Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. 
1998) (discussing the trial court’s reliance on the two-grant doctrine in its decision and defining the 
doctrine); 2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 327.2 (2012); 
Tevis Herd, Deed Construction and the “Repugnant to the Grant” Doctrine, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
635, 651 (1990). 
 57.  Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 90. 
 58.  966 S.W.2d 451 
 59.  Id. at 453. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
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1937 deed, and Concord Oil owned the grantee’s interest.62  Just as 
today’s shale plays are spawning lawsuits over mineral deeds delivered 
decades ago, renewed production on property covered by the 1937 deed 
prompted Pennzoil to sue Concord Oil in 1993. 
Pennzoil relied on precedent establishing the two-grant approach for 
interpreting multiclause deeds with conflicting fractions.  Under that 
approach, Pennzoil argued that the 1937 deed had conveyed a 1/96 
mineral interest and a 1/12 interest in rents and royalties under an 
existing lease, which had terminated.  Therefore, Pennzoil claimed that 
Concord Oil, as successor to the grantee, owned only a 1/96 interest in 
the mineral estate, meaning Pennzoil owned the grantor’s remaining 
interest.  Concord Oil, on the other hand, argued that the 1937 deed had 
conveyed the grantor’s entire 1/12 interest and Pennzoil had received 
nothing through its chain of title.
63
 
The trial court and court of appeals agreed with Pennzoil.
64
  
Eventually, however, the Texas Supreme Court ruled in favor of Concord 
Oil, holding that the conflicting fractions could be harmonized from the 
four-corners of the document.  In light of the particular language of the 
1937 deed, the court held it conveyed a single 1/12 mineral interest.
65
 
However, because the opinion was a plurality, with concurring and 
dissenting opinions, the fate of the two-grant doctrine remained 
unclear.
66
  Concord Oil had urged the court to reject the two-grant 
doctrine and embrace the estate misconception as the explanation for 
conflicting fractions in multiclause deed forms.  As explained above, that 
misconception, which emanates from the typical 1/8 landowner’s royalty, 
explains why the conflicting fractions follow a pattern: they are multiples 
of 1/8.  Typically, drafters multiplied the intended fraction by 1/8 and 
                                                          
 62.  Id. at 453–54 (noting that Concord Oil Company’s claim was brought through the grantee 
of the 1937 deed and that the 1937 grantor conveyed another mineral deed in 1961 which was 
subsequently conveyed to Pennzoil Exploration and Production Company). 
 63.  Id. at 454. 
 64.  Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 878 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. App. 
1994) (rejecting Concord’s reading of the deed to convey two separate estates), rev’d, 966 S.W.2d 
451 (Tex. 1998). 
 65.  Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 453. 
 66.  The opinion breaks down to a 4-1-4 decision.  Id. at 454.  The plurality found that the deed 
conveyed a single 1/12 mineral interest and harmonized the conflicting fractions within the deed.  Id. 
(plurality opinion). The concurring opinion by Justice Enoch agreed that only a single estate was 
created but wrote separately to emphasize the overconveyance that would occur if the dissent’s 
interpretations were used.  Id. (Enoch, J., concurring).  The dissent argued for the “two-grant” 
doctrine to determine that two estates were created, “a 1/96 perpetual interest in the minerals, and a 
1/12 interest in rentals and royalties . . . .”  Id. at 465 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). 
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inserted that number in the granting clause.  Indeed, early case law 
sanctioned that approach.
67
 
The 1937 Concord Oil deed followed the pattern: 1/96 in the 
granting clause = 1/8 times 1/12 (the fraction in the subsequent clause).
68
  
As another example, the deed at issue in a 1991 Texas Supreme Court 
case, Luckel v. White, contained the fractions 1/4 in the subject to and 
future lease clauses, but the smaller fraction 1/32 in the granting clause 
(1/4 times 1/8 = 1/32).
69
  As noted in Concord Oil, in light of the 
language appearing in the subsequent clauses, that fraction, rather than 
the smaller fraction in the granting clause, reflects the drafter’s intent 
about the size of the interest the grantor intended to convey. 
a. The Court Declined to Follow the Kansas Approach Regarding the 
Estate Misconception 
To convince the Texas court to incorporate the estate misconception 
into the interpretative process, Concord Oil pointed to Kansas decisions.  
Specifically, in Shepard v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., the 
Kansas Supreme Court construed a reservation in a deed that described 
the size of the interest as “an undivided 1/4 of the landowners [sic] 1/8 
royalty, or, 1/32 of the interest in and to all oil, gas or other 
minerals . . . .”70  The court held the grantor had reserved a 1/4 mineral 
interest.
71
  In reaching this conclusion, the court incorporated into its 
interpretative process the pervasive confusion among “not only persons 
in the petroleum industry” but with courts: 
 
  As the most common leasing arrangement provides for a one-eighth 
royalty reserved to the lessor, the confusion of fractional interests stems 
                                                          
 67.  Tipps v. Bodine, 101 S.W.2d 1076, 1079 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937); see also Concord Oil Co., 
966 S.W.2d at 464–65 (Tex. 1998) (Enoch, J., concurring) (blessing the use of different fractions to 
convey a single interest); see also Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 102 (noting the 
reliance on Tipps in interpreting multiclause deeds). 
 68.  Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 453. 
 69.  819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991).  For a summary of the Luckel decision, see Burney, 
Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 9–11 (rejecting the “granting clause 
prevails” standard under Alford and instead relying on the presence or absence of a future lease 
clause in determining the intent of the parties and the fraction conveyed). 
 70.  368 P.2d 19, 21 (Kan. 1962).  The Shepard deed was not a multiclause deed form, but it 
contained multiple fractions.  The Shepard deed form involved “double and restated” fractions 
discussed in the next section.  See infra Part II.C. 
 71.  Id. at 27.  A preliminary issue the court addressed was whether the interest was mineral or 
royalty.  That aspect of the decision is discussed later in this article (the Kansas Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Rucker). 
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primarily from the mistaken premise that all the lessor-land-owner 
owns is a one-eighth royalty.  In conveying minerals subject to an 
existing lease . . . mistake is often made in the fraction of the minerals 
conveyed by multiplying the intended fraction by one-eighth.
72
 
 
In Concord Oil, however, the Texas Supreme Court declined to fully 
follow the Shepard approach.  Instead, the court noted the estate 
misconception, but viewed it as “instructive, but not dispositive.”73  In 
fact, the court declined to adopt any bright-line rules for this 
interpretative issue, focusing instead on the lack of any two-grant 
language in the 1937 deed.
74
 
b. Guidelines from Concord Oil’s “Four-Corners” Approach 
Yet, as I wrote in an earlier article, the Concord Oil opinion provided 
“useful guidance to title examiners” for interpreting multiclause deeds: 
 
  First, according to the opinion, a deed with multiple fractions should 
not be interpreted as making two grants unless express language to that 
effect appears in the deed.  Such language would include the phrases 
‘separate from’ or ‘in addition to,’ phrases which were absent from the 
Concord deed.  Notably, [the additional clauses in multiclause deed 
forms] do not contain such granting language.  Therefore, multiclause 
deed forms should rarely, if ever, be interpreted as making separate 
grants.
75
 
 
Because of the multiple opinions in Concord Oil, title examiners 
remained cautious about interpreting multiclause deed forms with 
conflicting fractions.  The concurring opinion created particular concern 
by focusing on the future lease clause.
76
  In his opinion, Justice Enoch 
                                                          
 72.  Id. at 26 (citing Magnusson v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 331 P.2d 577, 583–84 (Kan. 
1958)); see also Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 22 (noting the 
pervasiveness of the 1/8 royalty in other jurisdictions).  Shepard did not involve a multiclause deed 
form; rather, the language fits the “restated” or “double fraction” problem I address in Part II.C.; see 
also Heyen v. Hartnett, 679 P.2d 1152, 1157–58 (Kan. 1984) (construing deed with fractions 1/16 
and 1/2 as conveying an undivided 1/2 mineral interest). 
 73.  Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 460. 
 74.  Id. at 460–61.  
 75.  Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 16. 
 76.  Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 464 (Enoch, J., concurring) (“Further, we were wrong to 
conclude that the ‘subject to’ clause of the Crosby deed includes future leases.”).  For a complete 
analysis of the concurring opinion, see Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 
8, at 17.  Justice Enoch was also concerned with the “overconveyance” issue.  See Concord Oil Co., 
966 S.W.2d at 464 (Tex. 1998) (Enoch, J., concurring); see also Burney, Interpreting Mineral and 
Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 17 (explaining that a two-grant interpretation of the deed would 
result in the grantor conveying more than he owned, which he cannot do). 
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criticized the plurality opinion for having emphasized a future lease 
clause in the deed as the basis for concluding the 1937 deed conveyed a 
1/12 interest.
77
  However, the plurality opinion adopted a four-corners 
approach and placed no significance on the presence or absence of any 
clause, particularly a future lease clause.  On the contrary, that opinion 
states that the “decision in this case does not depend on the presence or 
absence of a ‘future lease’ clause, which the court of appeals found 
dispositive.”78 
2.  Post-Concord Oil Decisions: The Demise of the “Two-Grant” 
Doctrine 
Despite these words from the Texas Supreme Court about the 
relative insignificance of a future lease clause, a post-Concord Oil 
appellate opinion considered it determinative.  Neel v. Killam Oil Co.79 
involved a multiclause deed form that departed from the typical pattern.  
Specifically, in the 1945 Neel deed, the larger fraction 1/2 appeared in 
the granting clause and subject to clause, and the smaller fraction 1/16 
appeared in the future lease clause.80  The parties agreed the interest was 
a royalty interest, rather than a mineral interest.81  Regarding the size of 
the interest, grantee’s successor argued the deed conveyed a 1/2 royalty, 
which would entitle the grantee to 1/2 of the royalty reserved in any 
existing or future leases.82  To counter assertions that the granting clause 
and future lease clause made separate grants, the grantee pointed to this 
sentence in the deed’s granting clause: “[t]his grant shall run forever.”83  
The controversy arose after the existing lease, with the typical 1/8 
landowner’s royalty, terminated and new leases were executed providing 
for a 1/4 royalty.84  The court of appeals ruled against the grantee, 
holding the grantee was entitled to a fixed 1/16 interest in production 
under the new leases as provided in the future lease clause.85  In other 
                                                          
 77.  Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 463–64 (Enoch, J., concurring). 
 78.  Id. at 458–59 (plurality opinion). 
 79.  88 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. App. 2002), disapproved of by Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 
469–70 (Tex. App. 2011).  
 80.  Id. at 339. 
 81.  Id. at 339–40.  The parties disagreed about whether this royalty interest was a fixed 1/16 or 
a 1/2 royalty that entitled the owner to 1/2 of the royalty reserved in any lease.  This “fixed” vs. “of” 
royalty issue is common and addressed in Part II.C of this paper (double and restated fractions). 
 82.  Id. at 340.  
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 341.  Neel was heard by the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio, the same court 
 
BURNEY_FINAL PRESS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2014  2:21 PM 
112 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
words, in Neel the court reverted to the two-grant doctrine.86 
In reaching this conclusion, the Neel court cited Concord Oil and 
Luckel, explaining that those cases required it to seek the parties’ intent 
from the four corners of the document.87  However, the Neel opinion omits 
any review of the two-grant saga, or of the specifics from Concord Oil, 
such as the court’s admonition that to create separate grants a deed should 
contain clear evidence of such intent.  Had the Neel court followed 
Concord Oil’s guidance, the deed would have been interpreted as 
conveying the 1/2 “of” royalty forever as set forth in the granting clause.  
The estate misconception explains the fraction in the future lease clause: 
1/16 reflects the amount of production owed to the owner of a royalty 
entitled to 1/2 of the 1/8 royalty reserved in the typical lease royalty 
clause.88 
Although the Texas Supreme Court declined to review Neel, a recent 
opinion from the same court of appeals “disapprove[d] of [its] analysis in 
Neel.”89  Hausser v. Cuellar involved a multiclause deed form that, like the 
deed in Neel, contained conflicting fractions that departed from the 
Concord Oil pattern.90  In Hausser, the clauses provided as follows: 
granting clause: 1/2; subject to clause: 1/2; future lease clause: 1/16.91  
After determining that the deed conveyed a royalty interest, the court 
considered whether it was a fixed 1/16 or a 1/2 royalty interest that entitled 
the owner to 1/2 of the 1/4 landowner’s royalty in new leases on the 
property.92  In adopting the 1/2 royalty option, the court cited its 2006 
opinion in Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., and explained its analysis as 
                                                          
that decided Concord prior to its review by the Supreme Court.  Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral 
Conveyances, supra note 10, at 24–25.  
 86.  Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral Conveyances, supra note 10, at 24–25.  
 87.  Neel, 88 S.W.3d at 339–40; Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral Conveyances, supra note 10, at 
24–25 (opining that Luckel overruled Alford’s “granting clause prevails” approach to multiclause 
deeds with conflicting fractions but failed to clearly articulate the interpretative approach it had 
adopted). 
 88.  See supra Part II.A.2.b. 
 89.  Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex. App. 2011) (pet. denied).  In disapproving, 
the court pointed to the Neel opinion’s reliance on a previous deed, which could suggest the court 
approved of Neel’s focus on the future lease clause.  Id.  Fortunately, the Hausser opinion embraced 
Concord Oil’s guidance and cited one of its previous opinions, Garza, which clearly rejected the 
two-grant doctrine and incorporated the estate misconception into its analysis.  See id. at 470–71 
(citing Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., 195 S.W.3d 137, 145 (Tex. App. 2006) (pet. denied)) (noting 
the conflicting fractions arise due to the typical 1/8 royalty and confusion about what grantors 
actually own). 
 90.  Id. at 470–71.   
 91.  Id. at 465, 468. 
 92.  Id. at 470–71. 
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follows: “As in Garza, our decision is consistent with Concord Oil Co. 
because the [Hausser] deed does not contain any language suggesting two 
differing estates were being conveyed.  Rather, the [Hausser] deed, like the 
deeds in Garza, involves a single conveyance with fixed rights.”93 
A dissenting opinion in Hausser argued that the future lease clause 
should have controlled.94  However, in light of the majority’s disapproval 
of Neel, its adherence to Concord Oil’s guidelines, and other recent 
appellate court decisions that acknowledge the role of the estate 
misconception,95 the two-grant doctrine should disappear in Texas.  
Fortunately, other jurisdictions have wisely declined to adopt Texas’s 
approach.96  Therefore, title examiners may report, without exaggerating, 
the death of the two-grant doctrine for interpreting multiclause deeds with 
conflicting fractions in the shale era.  Unfortunately, as described in the 
next section, court opinions have not sufficiently incorporated the estate 
misconception or the “legacy of the 1/8th royalty” into the interpretative 
process for related issues: deeds with double or restated fractions. 
C. “Double” or “Restated” Fractions—The Legacy of the “Usual 1/8th 
Landowner’s Royalty” 
Writing before the shale era, I addressed these two interpretative 
issues: how should courts interpret deeds when the fractional interest 
conveyed or reserved is expressed (1) as a double fraction, such as “1/2 
of 1/8,” or (2) as a restated fraction, such as “an undivided 1/2 non-
                                                          
 93.  Id. at 470 (citing Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., 195 S.W.3d 137, 146 (Tex. App. 2006); 
Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tex. 1998)). 
 94.  Id. at 472–73 (Marion, J., dissenting).  Note that the same judge wrote the majority opinion 
in Neel v. Killam Oil Co., Ltd., 88 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. App. 2002), disapproved of by Hausser, 
345 S.W.3d at 470. 
 95.  See Hamilton v. Morris Res., Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (holding 
that although there were differing fractions in the deed, only a single interest was actually 
conveyed); Garza, 195 S.W.3d at 145 (noting the “problematic conflict between the granting of a 
mineral interest and a future lease provision appearing to convey a smaller royalty interest”); see 
also Coates Energy Trust v. Frost Nat’l Bank, No. 04-11-00838-CV, 2012 WL 5984693, at *6–7 
(Tex. App. Nov. 28, 2012) (relying on Hausser in determining the fraction conveyed); Hernandez v. 
El Paso Prod. Co., No. 13-09-184-CV, 2011 WL 1442991, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2011) 
(taking notice of the estate misconception). 
 96.   Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral Conveyances, supra note 10, at 24 (describing the courts’ 
methods of dealing with mineral deeds); see also Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, 
supra note 8, at 23 (“[T]he Arkansas Supreme Court considered the issue that led the Texas courts 
down the path to the creative two-grants rule . . . .”) (quoting Owen L. Anderson, Recent 
Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, 45 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N § 1.03[4], at 
1-14 (1994)). 
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participating royalty (being equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16).”97  
In one article, I note courts’ failure to address the “legacy of the usual 
1/8
th
 landowner’s royalty,” which contributes to the estate 
misconception, and its effect on drafting and interpreting double and 
restated fractions.
98
  Because parties focused on that royalty, they 
expressed fractions with a double fraction, where one was invariably 1/8, 
or by restating with a fraction equal to a multiple of 1/8, as in the restated 
example above.
99
  Rather than analyze that legacy in light of other 
language in the deed, courts tended to ignore it or merely multiply the 
fractions. 
For example, in a 1984 Texas Supreme Court case, Alford v. Krum, 
the multiclause deed contained a double fraction, 1/2 of 1/8 in the 
granting clause. 
100
  The court viewed that clause as conveying a 1/16 
interest, without noting or analyzing this mode of expressing that single 
fraction.
101
  This phenomenon, like the use of the fraction 8/8 to express 
the term “all,” appears only in the oil patch.  And again, the legacy of the 
usual 1/8 royalty explains the practice since one of the two fractions is 
invariably the traditional 1/8 landowner’s royalty.  Yet in Alford and 
other cases, court opinions multiply the fractions without analyzing the 
reason for the formula. 
Before Alford, proponents of the analysis approach had argued that 
courts should incorporate the legacy of the 1/8 royalty into the 
interpretative process for these fractional issues.
102
  Under such an 
approach, the double or restated fractions “should not be multiplied, but 
analyzed to determine the parties’ intent.”103  Not all commentators agree 
with this approach, however.  Specifically, the Williams & Meyers 
                                                          
 97.  Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 23–28; Burney, The 
Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 89–97.  The restated language in the example appeared in 
Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. 1980) (holding deed ambiguous, which required 
remand to trial court). 
 98.  See generally Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8. 
 99.  See supra text accompanying note 35.  See also Brown, 593 S.W.2d at 940 (finding the 
deed in question restated the royalty as “[b]eing equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16th”). 
 100.  671 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex. 1984), overruled by Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 
1991). 
 101.  Id. at 873–74.  Alford adopted the “granting clause” prevails rule for the multiclause deed 
problem, but was subsequently overruled by Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 461. 
 102.  Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 24 (citing Ernest E. 
Smith, Conveyancing Problems, STATE BAR OF TEX., ADVANCED OIL, GAS, & MINERAL LAW 
COURSE G, G–2 (1981)). 
 103.  Id. at 25. Not all commentators agree with this approach. See 2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & 
CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 327.3, at 94.1 (2012) [hereinafter 2 WILLIAMS & 
MEYERS]. 
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Treatise argues that double fractions should be multiplied under a plain 
meaning approach to document interpretation.
104
  As described below, 
recent court opinions also reflect contradictory opinions in resolving 
these disputes. 
1.  Shale Era Cases 
Demonstrating that shale-production surges produce title-litigation 
surges, Texas courts recently have addressed several disputes involving 
double and restated fractions.  Most of these cases involve the grant or 
reservation of royalty interests in which the dispute centers on one 
question: whether the deed created a “fixed” or an “of” royalty interest.  
A “fixed” royalty entitles the owner to a set share of the proceeds from 
the sale of production, regardless of the fractional size of the landowner’s 
royalty in any lease.
105
  An “of” royalty interest varies with the size of 
the landowner’s royalty in leases.106  As demonstrated in the cases 
discussed below, these disputes arise when the royalty in a new lease 
                                                          
 104.  See, e.g., 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 103, § 327.3, at 94.1; Phillip E. Norvell, 
Pitfalls in Developing Lands Burdened by Non-Participating Royalty: Calculating the Royalty Share 
and Coexisting with the Duty Owed to the Non-Participating Royalty Owner by the Executive, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 933, 951 (1995).  The author approves of the “multiply” approach used by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court in Palmer v. Lide, in which the court held:  
 
  It will be seen that the deed refers not once but four times either to 1/8th of 1/8th of the 
royalty or to 1/8th of 1/8th of the royalty to be retained or reserved in any oil, gas, or 
mineral lease, leases, or contracts. It is not possible to interpret the unmistakably clear 
language of the deed to mean 1/8th of 1/8th of the total production, as the appellant 
would have us do.  
 
567 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Ark. 1978).  The author concludes that, “[o]ne cannot quarrel with the 
construction of the ‘double fraction’ formula by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Lide 
[sic] . . . . However, one is haunted by the fear that the ‘horrors of the double fraction’ may be the 
result of an error based simply on the parties’ selection of the wrong royalty deed form.”  Norvell, 
supra note 104 at 951. 
 105.  SMITH & WEAVER’S TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS, § 3.7, at 3-46 n.187.2. 
 106.  See Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tex. App. 2008) (comparing a 
fraction “of” royalty versus a “fractional” royalty and stating that a fraction “of” royalty “‘floats in 
accordance with the size of the landowner’s royalty contained in the lease”); see also WILLIAMS & 
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS Law § 327 (2012) [hereinafter WILLIAMS & MEYERS].  There is an additional 
difference: the effect of the executive’s duty to lease.  With an “of” royalty, the executive could 
potentially breach the duty of “utmost good faith” by negotiating a landowner’s royalty that was too 
low.  See Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., LLC, 395 S.W.3d 348, 364–65 (Tex. App. 2013).  If the 
royalty interest is fixed, however, the negotiated royalty cannot affect the “fixed” owner’s share of 
production.  See id. (discussing cases in which the executive breached the duty of utmost good faith 
by entering into a lease depriving the royalty owner of benefits they would have received in a lease 
to a disinterested party).  
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departs from the traditional 1/8 landowner’s royalty. 
Hudspeth v. Berry,
107
 a 2010 opinion, involved a dispute over a 1943 
deed reserving an “undivided 1/40th royalty interest (being 1/5th of 
1/8th)” with grantee reserving leasing rights, and the grantor receiving 
1/5 of the usual 1/8 royalty.
108
  The Berrys owned the reserved interest 
and claimed their predecessors were each entitled to 1/5 of the 1/5 
landowner’s royalty reserved in a new lease, or 1/25 of the proceeds 
from production.
109
  As a result, the Berrys claimed entitlement to a total 
of 2/25 of the production proceeds.
110
  The trial court agreed with the 
Berrys’ interpretation.111  The court of appeals, however, held the deed 
reserved two fixed 1/40 royalty interests, a ruling the Berrys did not 
appeal to the Texas Supreme Court.
112
 
However, an opinion decided two years before Berry addressed a 
deed with similar language, including an express reference to a royalty 
the size “of” the usual 1/8 lease royalty.  The deed in that case, Range 
Resources Corp. v. Bradshaw
113
 reserved: 
 
  an undivided one-half (1/2) Royalty (Being equal to not less than an 
undivided one-sixteent[h] (1/16)[)] of all the oil, gas and/or other 
minerals . . . to be paid or delivered to said Grantors . . .  free of cost 
Forever . . . .  In the event oil, gas or other minerals are produced . . . 
Grantors . . . shall receive not less than one-sixteenth (1/16) portion 
(being equal to one-half (1/2) of the customary one-eighth (1/8) 
Royalty) . . . .
114
 
 
Both the trial court and the court of appeals interpreted the 
reservation as a fraction “of” royalty rather than as a “fixed” fractional 
royalty.
115
  The appellate court opinion contains an extensive discussion 
of the difference between the two types of interests and reviews a 1980 
Texas Supreme Court case involving a reservation that raised the 
“restated” fraction problem.116  In that case, Brown v. Havard, the 
majority concluded that the deed was ambiguous, but the dissent viewed 
                                                          
 107.   No. 2-09-225-CV, 2010 WL 2813408 (Tex. App. July 15, 2010).  In the interest of full 
disclosure: I provided an expert opinion in support of Berry’s position. 
 108.  Id. at *2. 
 109.  Id. at *1. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at *4.  
 113.  Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. App. 2008). 
 114.  Id. at 493–94 (emphasis added). 
  115.  Id. at 497. 
  116.  See id. at 493–97 (discussing Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980)). 
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the deed as having unambiguously created a fraction “of” royalty.117  In 
Range Resources, the court addressed differences between the two deeds, 
but ultimately favored the dissent’s approach in Brown.118  The losing 
party in Range Resources asked the Texas Supreme Court to review the 
appellate court decision, but the court declined its petition.
119
 
A case decided in 2011 appears consistent with Range Resources 
rather than Berry.  In Sundance Minerals v. Moore, a deed reserved “an 
undivided and non-participating one-half interest in the oil, gas and other 
mineral rights” or “one half of the usual one eighth royalty received 
forsuch [sic] oil, gas and other minerals produced . . . .”120  The court 
held the deed reserved 1/2 “of” the 1/5 landowner’s royalty in the 
subsequent lease.
121
 
Although the result in Sundance Minerals reflects the analysis 
approach, that opinion, like the Range Resources opinion, does not 
overtly address the estate misconception or the legacy of the 1/8 royalty.  
However, in reaching their conclusions both opinions cite extensively to 
Luckel v. White and follow its harmonizing approach.
122
  That 1991 
Texas Supreme Court opinion, in which the court interpreted a deed with 
the conflicting fractions 1/4 and 1/32, expressly acknowledges the effect 
of the 1/8 royalty on drafting: 
 
                                                          
 117.   593 S.W.2d 939, 942, 945 (McGee, J., dissenting). 
 118.  Range Res. Corp., 266 S.W.3d at 495–96.  The initial dispute in Range Resources was 
whether the executive had breached its duty to the royalty owner by entering into a lease with only a 
1/8 landowner’s royalty.  Id. at 492.  That duty, however, has no application to a “fixed” royalty 
interest since leasing cannot affect the share owed to those interest owners.  See id. at 493.  The duty 
applies when the interest is a fraction “of” the lease royalty, since the executive must exercise 
leasing decisions according to an “utmost good faith” standard.  See Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., 
LLC, 395 S.W.3d 348, 370 (Tex. App. 2013) (noting that when the interest is a fraction “of” the 
lease royalty, the executive has more control and, therefore, is under an elevated duty).  In Range 
Resources, the royalty owner claimed the executive could have negotiated for 1/4 landowner’s 
royalty in the lease. 266 S.W.3d at 492.  The executive’s duty is addressed below (Lesley 
discussion).  See infra Part V. 
 119.  Petition for Review of Range Resources Corporation and Range Production I, L.P., Range 
Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw  (Tex. Dec. 28, 2008) (No. 08-0949) (pet. denied), available at 
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/ebriefs/08/08094901.pdf. 
 120.   354 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. App. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 121.  Id. at 512–13 (affirming trial court’s grant of summary judgment interpreting that the deed 
reserved 1/2 of the 1/5 royalty). 
 122.  See, e.g., Range Res. Corp., 266 S.W.3d at 496 (“Construing the deeds as a whole, and 
harmonizing all parts to give effect to the parties’ intent, we determine that a ‘fraction of royalty’ 
was conveyed.”); Sundance Minerals v. Moore, 354 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. App. 2011) (“All parts 
of the deed are to be harmonized, construing the instrument to give effect to all of its provisions.”). 
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  We do not quarrel with the assumption that the parties probably 
contemplated nothing other than the usual one-eighth royalty.  But that 
assumption does not lead to the conclusion that the parties intended 
only a fixed 1/32nd interest.  It is just as logical to conclude that the 
parties intended to convey one-fourth of all reserved royalty, and that 
the reference to 1/32nd in the first three clauses is “harmonized” 
because one-fourth of the usual one-eighth royalty is 1/32nd.
123
 
 
As in Range Resources, the losing party in Sundance Minerals 
petitioned the Texas Supreme Court to review the appellate court’s 
ruling.  That petition stressed the surge of shale production in Texas and 
the decline of the usual 1/8 landowner’s royalty, and asked the court to 
provide guidance: 
 
  Practitioners and lower courts dealing with the resurgence of cases 
need guidance on significant, recurring issues like the deed 
construction dispute presented in this petition for review.  Especially 
when language in deeds use differing fractions to express the intent of 
the parties regarding the character and size of the interest reserved, it is 
vitally important that all of the reviewing courts consistently apply the 
rules of interpretation and follow established precedent to reach the 
same results.
124
 
 
Despite this plea for guidance, the Texas Supreme Court declined to 
review the court of appeals’ decision in Sundance Minerals.  The court 
also denied a petition for review in another appellate opinion from 2012, 
Coghill v. Griffith.
125
  That opinion relies heavily on Luckel and cites 
Range Resources in concluding that a deed with restated and double 
fractions created an “of” royalty interest.126 
However, another recent opinion retreats to the “multiply” approach.  
In Moore v. Noble Energy, the court viewed the following language as 
creating a fixed 1/16 royalty interest: “a one-half non-participating 
royalty interest (one-half of one-eighth of production).”127  In that 
                                                          
 123.  Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991). 
 124.  Petition for Review of Sundance Minerals, L.P., at vii, Sundance Minerals, L.P. v. Moore, 
354 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. 2012) (No. 02-10-00403-CV) (pet. denied), available at 
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/ebriefs/12/12007801.pdf. 
 125.  Petition for Review of Coghill v. Griffith, 358 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App. 2012) (No.12-0170) 
(pet. denied), available at (http://data.scotxblog.com/scotx/no/12-0170.  
 126.  Id. at 838–40 (“The language used in Range Resources Corp. and in the instant case 
establishes that the interest reserved was a fraction of royalty and not a fractional royalty.”).  The 
deed’s language stated, “the Grantor reserves and excepts unto himself . . . an undivided one-eighth 
(1/8) of all royalties payable under the terms of said lease, as well as an undivided one-eighth (1/8) 
of the usual one-eighth (1/8) royalties provided for in any future” lease.  Id. at 836. 
 127.   374 S.W.3d 644, 645 (Tex. App. 2012) (emphasis added). 
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opinion, the court relies heavily on the Williams & Meyers treatise, 
which approves of multiplying rather than analyzing double fractions, 
and attempts, unsatisfactorily, to distinguish Range Resources.
128
 
Another recent appellate court opinion also strains to distinguish 
Range Resources and Sundance Minerals and, like the Moore opinion, 
retreats to the multiply approach.
129
  Wynne/Jackson Development v. 
PAC Holdings, Ltd., involves Barnett shale production from property in 
Denton County, Texas.
130
  The relevant language provided that the 
grantor reserved: 
 
  a non-participating royalty of one-half (1/2) of the usual one-eighth 
(1/8) royalty in and to all oil, gas, and other materials produced, saved 
and sold from the above-described property, provided, however, that 
although said reserved royalty is non-participating and Grantee shall 
own and possess all leasing rights in and to all oil, gas and other 
minerals, Grantor shall, nevertheless, have the right to receive one-half 
(1/2) of any bonus, overriding royalty interest, or other payments, 
similar or dissimilar, payable under the terms of any oil, gas and 
mineral lease covering the above-described property.
131
 
 
The parties framed the issue as whether the deed reserved a fixed or 
fraction “of” royalty.132  In reversing the trial court and holding the deed 
reserved a fixed fractional royalty, the court relied on cases, such as a 
                                                          
 128.  See id. at 647-51.  The court also relied on Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980). 
In Brown, a deed reserved “an undivided one-half non-participating royalty (being equal to, not less 
than an undivided 1/16th) . . . .”  Id. at 940. The majority opinion determined the deed was 
ambiguous and returned the case to the trial court.  Id. at 944.  A dissenting opinion, however, 
argued that the deed was unambiguous and conveyed a 1/2 “of” royalty.  Id. at 945 (McGee, J., 
dissenting). 
 129.  Wynne/Jackson Dev., L.P. v. PAC Capital Holdings, Ltd., No. 13-12-00449-CV, 2013 WL 
2470898, at *3 (Tex. App. June 6, 2013). 
 130.  Id. at *1. 
 131.  Id. at *4. 
 132.  The appellate opinion does not suggest that the deed reserved an undivided 1/2 non-
executive mineral interest, perhaps in light of the “non-participating royalty” label.  Id. at *4–5.  The 
owner of an undivided 1/2 mineral interest is entitled to 1/2 of the royalty, as explained above.  See 
supra Part II.C.1.  However, under the French redundancy approach, which focuses on express 
references to other mineral estate attributes, that may have been a viable argument.  See id. at *3 
(comparing the attributes of the mineral estate owned by a mineral fee owner with those of a non-
participating royalty owner).  Here, the grantor reserved a royalty plus the right to receive bonus 
payments, a mineral-estate attribute.  Id. at *4; see also Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex. 
1986) (finding that the deed, which stripped some mineral-estate attributes, created a non-executive 
mineral interest rather than royalty interest).  The Altman deed, however, did not expressly label the 
interest a “non-participating royalty interest.”  Id. at 118 (referring instead to a non-participating 
mineral interest). 
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1955 Texas Supreme Court decision, that multiplied, rather than 
analyzed, double fractions.
133
  In other words, unlike Range Resources 
and Sundance Minerals, the Wynne/Jackson decision ignores the legacy 
of the usual 1/8 landowner’s royalty, despite the express reference to that 
royalty in the deed. 
2. Lessons from the Double and Restated Fraction Cases for the Shale 
Era 
The results reached in Sundance Minerals, Range Resources, and 
Coghill reflect the analysis approach for double and restated fractions.
134
  
That approach respects the goal of deed interpretation, which is to 
ascertain the intent of the parties.  The analysis approach also promotes 
title stability by seeking intent from the four corners of the deeds, 
without resorting to outside evidence.  Sundance Minerals, Range 
Resources, and Coghill reach results consistent with language within the 
deeds.  Specifically, the deeds in each of those cases mention the “usual 
1/8 lease royalty” and describe the interest at issue as a fraction “of” that 
royalty.
135
  By noting those provisions and relying on Luckel’s 
“harmonizing” approach, those opinions incorporate the legacy of that 
once-common royalty on drafting into the interpretative process. 
The Berry, Moore, and Wynne/Jackson opinions, on the other hand, 
ignore express references to the “usual 1/8 royalty” and other language, 
including the reference to a 1/5 interest in Berry and a 1/2 interest in 
                                                          
 133.  The court cited Harriss v. Ritter, a case which held that the double fractions “‘one-half of 
one-eighth . . . could have but one meaning and that is 1/16th of the royalty . . . .’”  Wynne/Jackson, 
2013 WL 2470898, at *4 (quoting Harriss v. Ritter, 279 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1955)). 
 134.  Sundance Minerals v. Moore, 354 S.W.3d 507, 511–13 (Tex. App. 2011) (employing only 
“the express language found within the four corners of [the deed]” to determine the interested the 
parties intended to convey); Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490, 493, 496–97 (Tex. 
App. 2008) (looking exclusively to “the objective intent expressed or apparent in the writing” to 
determine the royalty conveyed); Coghill v. Griffith, 358 S.W.3d 834, 836–40 (Tex. App. 2012) 
(also using the four corners rule to determine the parties intended to grant a fraction of royalty).  
Another recent case, which is not reported, expressly endorses the analysis approach and 
consideration of the “estate misconception.”  See Hernandez v. El Paso Prod. Co., No. 13-09-184-
CV, 2011 WL 1442991, at *4 (Tex. App. Apr. 14, 2011) (citing Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable 
Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine in Texas Deed Construction, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 86 (1993)). 
 135.  See, e.g., Sundance Minerals, 354 S.W.3d at 511–12 (finding that the grantor meant to 
reserve “one half of the usual one eighth” royalty); Range Res. Corp., 266 S.W.3d, at 493 (noting the 
problems the estate misconception played in deed construction); Coghill, 358 S.W.3d at 838–39 
(harmonizing the differing fractions in the deed in light of the usual 1/8 royalty). 
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Moore and Wynne/Jackson.
136
  Further departing from the four-corners 
rule, the Moore and Wynne/Jackson opinions insert language not found 
in the document—the fraction 1/16.137  In short, these three decisions 
merely multiply and fail to analyze the language in the deeds. 
For future drafting, the decisions discussed above and others teach 
these lessons: drafters should state expressly whether they intend to 
convey or reserve a “fixed fractional interest” rather than a fraction “of” 
the royalty reserved in existing and any future leases.  An additional 
statement should expressly clarify that, for instance, a fraction is not a 
“fixed” interest, if an “of” royalty interest is intended.  And the size of 
that “fraction ‘of’ royalty” or “fixed royalty” should be stated as a single 
rather than a double fraction. 
However, as a Texas court noted in Barker v. Levy when reviewing 
drafting advice regarding the “mineral or royalty” issue, discussed 
below, “It is quite probable that these [parties] now heartily agree with 
this advice.  However, it was written [decades] too late to have been 
helpful” in the shale era.138  Title examiners could view the Texas 
Supreme Court’s decisions declining petitions for review in Sundance 
Minerals, Range Resources and Coghill as approval of those better-
reasoned opinions.
139
  The Texas Supreme Court’s opinions in Luckel 
and Concord Oil also support the approach in those three cases by 
                                                          
 136.  Hudspeth v. Berry, No. 2-09-225-CV, 2010 WL 2813408, at *1 (Tex. App. July 15, 2010) 
(interpreting the deed as granting two fixed royalty interest instead of the “1/5th of 1/8th” royalty); 
Moore v. Noble Energy, Inc., 374 S.W. 3d 644, 651 (Tex. App. 2012) (interpreting the deed to 
“reserve a royalty of one-half of one-eighth of production, or one-sixteenth”); Wynne/Jackson, 2013 
WL 2470898, at *1–2, *5 (Tex. App. June 6, 2013) (finding that the interest conveyed was a 
fractional royalty, not a fraction of royalty and entitled Wynne/Jackson to one sixteenth of 
production instead of 1/2 of the usual 1/8 royalty). 
 137.  See Moore, 374 S.W.3d at 647–48 (Tex. App. 2012) (relying on MARTIN & KRAMER, 
supra note 35, to insert language into the deed).  The Moore opinion also diverts to another troubled 
interpretative trail: the court views the lack of a producing well at the time the deed was drafted as 
relevant to interpreting the deed.  Id. at 651.  However, as discussed in the next section, allowing 
such extraneous facts to affect the interpretative process detracts from title stability.  See infra 
discussion Part III.B.1.b. (analyzing Oklahoma approach, which allows the term “royalty” to change 
depending on existence of lease at time of drafting).  See also Wynne/Jackson, 2013 WL 2470898, at 
*1–2, *5 (interpreting deed language describing a “‘one-half (1/2) of the usual one-eighth (1/8) 
royalty in and to all oil, gas and minerals, produced, saved and sold from [such property]’” as 
granting a fixed royalty of 1/16 of the production). 
 138.  Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
 139.  The same reasoning would apply to the Texas Supreme Court’s decision not to accept 
petitions for the multiclause deed cases, Garza and Hausser.  But see TEX. R. APP. P. 56.1 (noting 
that petitions denied do not carry the same precedential value as petitions refused, which are viewed 
as Supreme Court opinions). 
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acknowledging the legacy of the 1/8 royalty.
140
  Absent firmer 
endorsement from the state’s high court, however, these mixed opinions 
may motivate parties to file lawsuits over deeds with double and restated 
fractions in the shale era. 
III. THE “MINERAL OR ROYALTY” QUESTION 
As noted above, in addition to the decision about the size of the 
fractional interest a grantor intends to create, drafters must decide 
whether to create a mineral or royalty interest.  In fact, several of the 
fractional-interest cases discussed above also involved this second 
inquiry.
141
  This section examines the drafting advice provided in Barker, 
which encourages the use of the “mineral” or “royalty” labels, and 
contributes additional statements for distinguishing between the two.
142
 
A. The Value of the “Mineral” or “Royalty” Label in Drafting and 
Interpreting Deeds 
Although the Barker advice appears in a 1974 case and quotes from 
a 1958 article, its suggestion to use mineral and royalty labels has merit 
today.
143
  However, in order to pick a label, drafters must engage in two 
prior steps in the decision-making process.  First, drafters should 
examine the differences between mineral and royalty interests; and, 
second, they should decide which type they prefer to create.  However, 
as noted in Barker, this drafting advice comes too late for title examiners 
today faced with interpreting decades-old deeds.
144
  Complicating the 
interpretative process, decades of decisions from different states provide 
                                                          
 140.  See Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991) (discussing the “usual one-eighth 
royalty”); Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 459 (Tex. 1998) 
(noting that the prevailing royalty in private oil and gas leases was a 1/8 royalty during the Era in 
which the Concord deed was executed). 
 141.  Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tex. App. 2011) (noting that “after determining 
both deeds conveyed a mineral interest as opposed to a royalty interest, [the court] addressed the 
issue of the conflicting fractions”); Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., 195 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. App. 
2006) (deciding first that “the deeds conveyed a mineral interest” before addressing the conflicting 
fractions). 
 142.  Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
 143.  Id. (quoting Emery, Conveyancing of Interests in Oil and Gas, 29 Okla. B.J. 1965 (1958)) 
(advising that deeds conveying royalties should contain language stating “‘it is the intention of the 
parties hereto to convey a royalty interest as distinguished from a mineral interest’”). 
 144.  Id. (noting, in particular, that Emery’s drafting advice came “twenty-eight years too late to 
have been helpful” in interpreting the Barker deed).  
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differing advice about the appropriate language for creating each type of 
interest.  This section reviews the differences between mineral and 
royalty interests and the value of these labels in the interpretative 
process. 
1.  The Difference between Mineral and Royalty Interests: The Bundle 
of Sticks 
Theoretically, drafters in the shale era should understand the 
differences between mineral and royalty interests.  Courts articulate those 
differences by analogizing to the classic property law concept, “the 
bundle of sticks.”145  Specifically, the sticks in the mineral-estate bundle 
consist of the following: “(1) the right to develop (the right of ingress 
and egress), (2) the right to lease (the executive right), (3) the right to 
receive bonus payments, (4) the right to receive delay rentals, [and] 
(5) the right to receive [landowner’s] royalty payments.”146  Stated 
differently, a mineral interest is a cost-bearing interest that entitles the 
owner to a proportionate share of lease benefits, including bonus, rentals, 
and landowner’s royalty. 
A royalty interest, on the other hand, is a non-cost bearing interest 
devoid of the mineral-estate sticks, except the right to share in proceeds 
from the sale of production.
147
  In other words, a “royalty” is non-cost 
bearing and non-participating interest, meaning the owner cannot execute 
leases or develop the property.  When an owner creates a royalty interest 
by deed or reservation, the label “non-participating royalty interest” 
applies, which distinguishes that interest from mineral interests and from 
the royalty reserved in the lease.
148
 
                                                          
 145.  See, e.g., Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 480–81 (Tex. 2011) 
(stating that the “right to lease minerals—the executive right—is one ‘stick’ in the bundle of five real 
property rights that comprise a mineral estate”).  Courts and commentators also refer to the “sticks” 
that comprise a mineral interest as the incidents or attributes of the mineral estate.  See, e.g., Altman 
v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986) (listing the “five essential attributes of a severed mineral 
estate”); Hamilton v. Morris Resources, Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. App. 2007).  See generally 
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 106, § 202.2.  Pennsylvania is a major shale-era state with 
relatively little case law for resolving shale era disputes, including the “magic words” for creating 
mineral and royalty interests.  Id.; see also infra Part IV.A (examining the effect of old Pennsylvania 
precedent on the meaning of “minerals”). 
 146.  Altman, 712 S.W.2d at 118. 
 147.  See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 35, at 964 (noting the characteristics of a royalty 
interest). 
 148.  See id. at 698 (noting the characteristics of a non-participating royalty interest); Hamilton, 
225 S.W.3d at 344 (defining the properties of a non-participating royalty interest).  
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2.   The Nonparticipating Royalty Interest vs. Mineral Interest 
(Participating and Non-Executive): The Well-Drafted Form in the 
Shale Era 
Proceeding with the ideal pre-drafting decision-making process, after 
reviewing the differences between a royalty and mineral interest, Owner 
would consider additional questions.  Does Owner intend for Grantee to 
have the right to execute leases and share in lease benefits?  Or does 
Owner prefer to create an non-participating royalty interest that may 
simply someday entitle Grantee to a share of production?  Additional 
questions include whether Owner prefers to maintain all leasing rights in 
the property, even if he intends to convey a mineral interest, which is a 
viable option because the “sticks” in the mineral estate bundle are 
severable.  Indeed, as discussed below, Owners often sever the executive 
right and create non-executive or non-participating mineral interests.
149
  
In those instances, Owner maintains the right to lease the entire mineral 
estate, but Grantee shares proportionately in lease benefits, such as rents 
and royalties.
150
 
Assuming Owner has proceeded through this process and selected 
the interest he intends to create, the next question is which language 
should Owner insert in the deed?  At this point, the advice suggested in 
Barker warrants repeating: “good draftsmanship requires that where a 
conveyance of a royalty is intended, [t]here should be added the proviso 
that ‘it is the intention of the parties hereto to convey a royalty interest as 
distinguished from a mineral interest.’”151 
Fortunately, many deed forms today embrace that advice and 
consistently adopt the mineral or royalty labels.  Non-participating 
royalty is now an industry-accepted term.
152
  Additionally, well-drafted 
forms include other phrases endorsed in case law for creating mineral 
versus royalty interests.  For example, courts have equated the phrase “in 
and under” with the creation of a mineral interest and that phrase appears 
                                                          
 149.  See infra Part V.D. 
 150.  Altman, 712 S.W.2d at 118–20 (noting that the deed reserved the rights to lease and receive 
royalty to the grantor but that the grantees were entitled to a fraction of the royalty reserved under 
the lease). 
 151.  Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (internal citation omitted). 
 152.  The deed form in this case clearly created a non-participating royalty interest and avoided 
the “mineral or royalty” question.  See 11 TEX. PRAC., TEXAS METHODS OF PRACTICE § 16:21 (3d 
ed. 2013) (form for nonparticipating royalty interest deed). 
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in mineral deed forms.
153
  Ideally, forms today avoid contradictory terms, 
such as combining the royalty label with an express grant of “ingress and 
egress,” a stick in the mineral estate bundle.154  As discussed below, 
however, drafters of new deeds should check whether forms reflect the 
dictates of case law.  The next section examines precedent affecting the 
mineral or royalty question. 
B. The “Precedent Problem” and the “Mineral or Royalty” Question in 
the Shale Era 
1. The Texas v. Oklahoma Approaches 
Although title examiners prefer to encounter the ideal forms 
described above, courthouses across the country contain countless deeds 
with contradictory and confusing terms.  Litigation over the 
interpretation of those deeds has produced often misguided opinions, 
creating a precedent problem for title examiners and courts in the shale 
era.  In many disputes, courts accord great weight to the royalty label in 
the deed interpretation process.
155
  However, to understate the problem, if 
“the word ‘royalty’ is coupled with other terms, the result is not always 
clear.”156  Additionally, other jurisdictions, notably Oklahoma, allow the 
meaning of royalty to change depending on whether a lease was 
outstanding on the property.
157
 
a. Texas 
Writers often note that other states look to Texas law for guidance in 
resolving oil and gas disputes.
158
  Indeed, as the nation’s second largest 
                                                          
 153.  See, e.g., 6 WILLIAM B. BURFORD, WEST’S TEXAS FORMS: MINERALS, OIL & GAS § 1:3 
(4th ed. 2012) (form using “in and under” to create a mineral interest). 
 154.  See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 103, § 304.2–4.8 (describing the various phrases 
that are associated with a royalty interest). 
 155.  See generally HEMINGWAY ET AL., OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 80 (4th ed. 2004) 
(noting that in many jurisdictions, “the presence of the term ‘royalty’ may convert what is otherwise 
a mineral interest to one of royalty only”).  
 156.  Id. 
 157.  See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 158.  Kurth, supra note 4, 4-1 at § 4.09; Rebecca W. Watson, Hydraulic Fracturing as a 
Subsurface Trespass: Will Texas Precedent Lead the Way, 49 ROCKY MTN MIN. L. FOUND. J. 235, 
235 (2012).  Not all states decide to follow Texas’s lead on resolving oil and gas disputes.  See, e.g., 
Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 657, 660 (Colo. 1994) (noting Texas approach charging 
landowner with share of post-production costs under market value royalty provision and rejecting it).  
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state with a long and strong production history from millions of primarily 
private acres of land, Texas has produced volumes of case law on a 
variety of issues.  Historically, dozens of Texas decisions have addressed 
the mineral or royalty inquiry.
159
  However, the Texas Supreme Court 
last addressed that question in two cases from the 1990s, French v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
160
 in 1995 and Temple-Inland Forest Products 
Corp. v. Henderson Family Partnership
161
 in 1997.  The deeds at issue in 
those cases presented the problem of the “royalty” label mixed with 
mineral terms.  The French deed was titled “mineral deed.”162  Yet titles 
of documents carry little weight in the interpretative process.
163
  
However, the deed also included the mineral phrase, “in, under and that 
may be produced from . . . .”164  The confusion arose in a second 
paragraph, which expressly stated that the “conveyance is a royalty 
interest only,” and continued to strip from the conveyance all of the 
sticks in the mineral estate bundle, except the right to receive a fixed 
fractional share of production.
165
  That fixed fraction, which appeared in 
the granting clause, was stated as “being an undivided 1/656.17th” 
interest.
166
 
The parties disputed whether the deed conveyed a mineral interest or 
a fixed fractional royalty interest.
167
  The difference in monetary terms 
was significant: if the deed conveyed a fixed fractional royalty, the 
grantee’s successor-in-interest was entitled to that fixed share of the 
proceeds from the sale of the production.
168
  On the other hand, if the 
                                                          
 159.  Dozens of articles and treatises have also addressed the issue.  See, e.g., HEMINGWAY, 
supra note 155, at 80–81 (discussing the role of a deed’s language in determining whether a mineral 
or royalty interest has been conveyed); Burney, Interpreting  Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 
8, at 2.  See generally Richard C. Maxwell, Mineral or Royalty–The French Percentage, 49 SMU L. 
REV. 543 (1996). 
 160.  896 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1995). 
 161.  958 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1997). 
 162.  French, 896 S.W.2d at 796. 
 163.  WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 106, at § 304.1, at 467–68) (“The title of the instrument 
is never given conclusive effect in the construction process and rarely, if ever, has paramount 
importance.”). 
 164.  French, 896 S.W.2d at 796. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id.  The granting clause also described the interests as “an undivided Fifty (50) acre 
interest,” a fact that the court pointed to in reaching its conclusion that the deed created a mineral 
interest.  Id. at 797–98. 
 167.  Id. at 796. 
 168.  Id. (noting that the grantee’s successor maintained that “the deed conveyed a pure fixed 
royalty interest . . . [in] production”). 
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deed conveyed only a 1/656.17 fractional mineral interest, the grantee’s 
cost-bearing interest must be multiplied by the 1/8 landowner’s royalty in 
the lease, meaning the owner received 1/5248 of the proceeds.
169
 
The Texas Supreme Court held the deed conveyed a mineral 
interest.
170
  In reaching its conclusion, the court applied what critics 
labeled a redundancy approach.
171
  According to the court, the interest 
described was not a royalty interest because the express language 
removing the attributes of the mineral estate “would serve no purpose 
whatsoever if the interests in minerals being conveyed was a 1/656.17 
royalty interest, that is, 1/656.17 of all production.”172 
For drafting after 1995, French taught these lessons: if Owner 
intends to convey a royalty interest, use that term, avoid contradictory 
mineral phrases, such as “in and under,” and omit any reference to the 
attributes of the mineral estate.
173
  As always, however, such advice 
comes too late for title examiners faced with determining the meaning of 
existing deeds.  Fortunately, the Texas Supreme Court revisited French 
two years later in Temple-Inland and produced an opinion that assuaged 
the concerns of critics, who viewed French as having incorrectly ignored 
the “royalty” label in the interpretation process.174 
The Temple-Inland deed involved a reservation of a 1/16 interest.
175
  
                                                          
 169.  Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral Conveyances, supra note 10, at 7. 
 170.  French, 896 S.W.2d at 798. 
 171.   Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 34 (citing David E. 
Pierce, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: The Continuing Search for Analytical 
Foundations, 47 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 1-1, 1-18 (1996)). 
 172.  French, 896 S.W.2d at 798. 
 173.  One writer suggests using the royalty label multiple times.  See Terry Cross, Why Texas 
Titles are Different, 4 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. 16 (2007) (“Temple-Inland opinion awards 
cumulative points for repeating a key word six times.  If saying the same thing over six times adds 
certainty in this treacherous area, who can afford not to do it?  Simply saying, ‘this conveyance is a 
royalty interest’ only once was insufficient to create a royalty interest under French v. Chevron.” 
(citing Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp. v. Henderson Family P’shp, Ltd., 958 S.W.2d 183, 186 
(Tex. 1997))). 
 174.  See Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 34 (opining that the 
French court ignored prior case law that had given weight to the royalty label and instead should 
have viewed the language removing the mineral-estate attributes as affirming the royalty label). 
 175.  958 S.W.2d at 184.  The issue in the case was whether a deed had reserved a mineral or a 
royalty interest.  Id. at 183–84.  An unanswered question from the opinion is why the deed expressly 
conveyed a 15/16 mineral interest.  Id. at 184.  In other words, who is the owner of the other 1/16 
mineral interest?  The appellate court had focused on this fact in holding that the deed must have 
reserved a 1/16 mineral interest.  Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp. v. Henderson Family P’ship, 
Ltd., 911 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Tex. App. 1995) (discussing what percentage of the mineral interest was 
retained), rev’d, 958 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1997); see also Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty 
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As in French, initial language in the reservation reflected a mineral 
interest.  However, the deed continued to repeatedly describe the interest 
as “royalty,” and specifically described it as non-cost bearing.176  
Although the court did not overrule French, it effectively limited it to its 
facts.
177
  Therefore, in future disputes, one could infer that the royalty 
label should carry weight in the interpretative process.  However, the 
Texas Supreme Court focused on the particular language in the Temple-
Inland deed, and avoided sweeping statements about the value of the 
royalty label in general.
178
  Therefore, parties whose rights depend on 
deeds with mixed mineral and royalty terms will remain motivated to 
litigate in the shale era. 
b.  Oklahoma 
In resolving the mineral or royalty question, Texas courts have 
properly not considered whether a lease existed on the property at the 
time the deed was executed.
179
  Unfortunately, that approach has been 
adopted in some jurisdictions, notably Oklahoma: 
 
  The Oklahoma courts have been consistent in following the approach 
that the existence of a lease on the property at the time of execution of a 
                                                          
Deeds, supra note 8, at 42–43 (noting that the Supreme Court did not answer the obvious question of 
who owned the 1/16 mineral interest). 
 176.  Temple-Inland, 958 S.W.2d at 184. 
 177. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 41.  In particular, the 
court addressed the French opinion’s approach to Watkins v. Slaughter.  Temple-Inland, 958 S.W.2d 
at 185.  The French opinion viewed Watkins as requiring not only the term “royalty” but also the 
additional phrase from “actual production.”  French, 896 S.W.2d at 797.  The Temple-Inland 
opinion clarified that the “‘royalty’ label—without the phrase ‘from actual production’—is a reliable 
indicator of intent when interpreting and drafting deeds.”  Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty 
Deeds, supra note 8, at 42; see also Temple-Inland, 958 S.W.2d at 186 (distinguishing the language 
from French that the words “royalty from actual production” are not required).  However, a recent 
Texas case relied on the “redundancy analysis” from French to hold a multiclause deed form 
conveyed a stripped mineral interest.  Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., 195 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. 
App. 2006).  “Furthermore, the reservation of the [mineral estate attributes] would have been 
redundant if the deeds intended to convey a royalty interest.  Therefore . . . we hold that the deeds 
conveyed a mineral interest.”  Id. 
 178.  Temple-Inland, 958 S.W.2d at 184–85. 
 179.  In some Texas opinions, however, courts appear to be influenced by whether or not a lease 
was on the property.  See Moore v. Noble Energy, Inc., 374 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Tex. App. 2012) 
(“The centerpiece of the Moores’ argument is the contention that the deed reasonably can be 
construed to reserve a royalty of one-half the royalty retained by the lessor in a future lease.”).  But 
see Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613, 617 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (“[T]here is no requirement in 
Texas law that a lease be in effect before a royalty interest can be created.”). 
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deed indicates an intent that a royalty interest was created, and that the 
word ‘royalty’ in those cases should be construed in a narrow sense.  
Where no lease was outstanding at the time, the broader construction of 
mineral interest has been applied.
180
 
 
Scholars have consistently criticized the Oklahoma approach for 
creating title uncertainty and drafting problems: 
 
  The average lawyer often has difficulty in understanding the difference 
between a royalty and a mineral interest.  The Oklahoma cases further 
complicate such a lawyer’s task by requiring him or her to determine 
which of several meanings a term may have.  The inevitable result has 
been litigation and a small, highly specialized bar.
181
 
c. Drafting Lessons from the Texas and Oklahoma Approaches 
In the shale era, drafters should accord the terms “mineral” and 
“royalty” set meanings that reflect the bundle of sticks concept.  Texas 
courts have, for the most part, endorsed that approach, which provides 
predictability for title examiners.  Texas courts also ensure predictability 
and title certainty by resolving the mineral or royalty question from the 
four corners of the document as a matter of law.  On the contrary, the 
Oklahoma cases have concluded the deeds were ambiguous, which 
requires factual determinations regarding the presence or absence of a 
lease in the trial court before meaning can be assigned to a deed.
182
 
In response to the Oklahoma cases, drafters in that state should heed 
the Barker advice and add a sentence clarifying that a royalty interest, 
not a mineral interest, is intended, regardless of the presence or absence 
of a lease.
183
  For title examiners, owners and courts, however, the 
Oklahoma approach will continue to affect deed interpretation cases in 
the shale era, in that state and possibly others.  A recent North Dakota 
case provides an example.  In Hamilton v. Woll, the North Dakota 
                                                          
 180.  HEMINGWAY, supra note 155, at 76 (quoting Richard Hemingway, Mineral-Royalty 
Distinction in Oklahoma, 52 Okla. B.J. 2791, 2795 (1981); see, e.g., Melton v. Sneed, 109 P.2d 509, 
512–13 (Okla. 1940) (holding the deed ambiguous and establishing a rule of construction that a 
royalty term creates a mineral interest if no reference appears in the deed to any lease).  Other 
jurisdictions may focus on the presence or absence of a lease, for varying reasons.  See generally 
HEMINGWAY, supra note 155, at 72–78 (discussing approaches used in West Virginia, Colorado and 
other jurisdictions). 
 181.  HEMINGWAY, supra note 155, at 77. 
 182.  See, e.g., Melton, 109 P.2d at 512–13 (noting the impact of the presence of a lease on the 
construction of royalties). 
 183.  Barker, 507 S.W.2d at 618. 
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Supreme Court held fifteen 1950s deeds were ambiguous.
184
  The deeds 
contained mixed terms and other deeds executed by the grantor had 
previously been litigated.
185
  The proponent of the mineral interpretation 
pointed to the fact that the grantor “was from Oklahoma and during the 
time the 15 deeds were executed it was ‘a matter of common knowledge’ 
that ‘the word [royalty] [wa]s frequently used in [Oklahoma] to denote 
an interest in the mineral rights.”186  While Hamilton may be limited to 
its facts, shale-producing states writing on cleaner precedent plates 
should avoid the Oklahoma path in favor of the Texas approach for 
resolving the mineral or royalty question.
187
 
2.  The Kansas Approach: Avoiding Non-Participating Royalty Interests 
and the Rule Against Perpetuities 
While Oklahoma courts have focused on the presence or absence of 
an oil and gas lease in the mineral or royalty analysis, another fact plays 
a role in Kansas decisions: the need to avoid application of the common 
law rule against perpetuities.  Under basic property law principles, the 
rule against perpetuities applies to non-vested interests, which are void if 
they fail to vest beyond the time frame allowed by the rule.
188
  Most 
states view the grant or reservation of a royalty interest (or non-
participating royalty interest) as creating a vested property interest, 
whether or not the interest-owner ever receives royalty payments, 
thereby escaping the rule against perpetuities’ application.189 
                                                          
 184.  823 N.W.2d 754 (N.D. 2012). 
 185.  Id. at 756 (noting that the deeds “were preprinted ‘Mineral Deed’ forms but stated . . . that 
they conveyed undivided fractional ‘Royalty’ interests” and that similar deeds executed by the 
grantor Hamilton were found to be ambiguous in Williams Co. v. Hamilton) (citing Williams Co. v. 
Hamilton, 427 N.W.2d 822, 824 (N.D. 1988)). 
 186.  Id. at 757 (citing Melton, 109 P.2d at 513). 
 187.  See, e.g., Ray v. Luce, No. EQ 1989-15, 1990 WL 305162, at *584–85 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
Sept. 12, 1990) (relying on “sticks” in the bundle for resolving mineral or royalty issue). 
 188.  Gray’s classic definition of the rule against perpetuities is, “[n]o interest is good unless it 
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the 
interest.”  JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed. 
1942). 
 189.  See Burney, A Pragmatic Approach, supra note 14, at 46 (citing Hanson v. Ware, 274 
S.W.2d 359 (Ark. 1955); Gulf Refining Co. v. Stanford, 30 So.2d 516 (Miss. 1947); Schlittler v. 
Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1937) (noting most jurisdictions have viewed non-
participating royalty interest’s as a vested interest).  Other oil-patch interests raise rule against 
perpetuities issues, but courts generally avoid voiding the interest.  Id. (discussing courts’ creative 
approaches to avoid voiding reserved term interests).  A poorly drafted document, however, could 
fall prey to the rule against perpetuities’ effects.  See Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 
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Kansas, however, has adopted a different view.
190
  In Cosgrove v. 
Young, the court viewed the vesting event for non-participating royalty 
interests as the time in the future when oil and gas royalties become 
payable under an oil and gas lease.
191
  Because it is possible that leases 
might not ever be executed, “there would never be a vesting of title to 
any royalty interest.”192  Cosgrove was decided in 1982 and relied on a 
1951 decision, Lathrop v. Eyestone.
193
  In addressing calls to overrule 
Lathrop, the Cosgrove court responded, “[w]e are not unmindful that 
some other jurisdictions might well reach a different result” regarding the 
rule against perpetuities’ application to non-participating royalty 
interests.
194
  However, the court refused to retreat from Lathrop, 
concluding “we see no compelling reason for change.”195 
Several writers, including a strong dissenting opinion in Cosgrove, 
have asserted compelling reasons for change, such as a treatise’s 
prediction that the Kansas view would lead to an inefficient “division of 
minerals into small shares held in common.”196  That prediction 
recognizes that courts faced with the mineral or royalty issue stretch for a 
mineral determination in order to avoid the rule against perpetuities’ 
application.
197
  One example is Shepard v. John Hancock Mutual Life 
Insurance Co., noted above for embracing the estate misconception in 
                                                          
1982) (finding that a top deed worded to postpone vesting until termination of bottom lease violated 
rule against perpetuities). 
 190.  Unlike other states, Kansas views an non-participating royalty interest as personal property 
rather than real property.  See Shepard v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 368 P.2d 19, 23–24 
(Kan. 1962) (stating that as a right to share in production, royalties are personal property while 
mineral interests refer to an interest in resources “in and under the land” and are therefore interests in 
real property).  However, the Kansas decisions regarding whether non-participating royalty interests 
violate rule against perpetuities do not focus on that distinction. 
 191.  642 P.2d 75, 84 (Kan. 1982). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. at 78–83 (citing Lathrop v. Eyestone, 227 P.2d 136 (Kan. 1951)). 
 194.  Cosgrove v. Young, 642 P.2d. 75, 84 (Kan. 1982). 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 89 (Herd, J., dissenting) (pointing out the inconsistencies between the Lathrop rule 
and the treatment of other interests comparable to royalties) (quoting 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra 
note 103, at § 324.4); see also Burney, A Pragmatic Approach, supra note 14, at 47 (emphasizing the 
dissent’s policy arguments). 
 197.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 8–11, Rucker v. Delay, 289 P.3d 1166 (Kan. 2012) (No. 
101,766), 2011 WL 3575902, at *8–11  (noting that if the interest is a mineral interest it avoids the 
question of the rule against perpetuities altogether); see also David E. Pierce, Recent Developments 
in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: Beyond Theories and Rules to the Motivating Jurisprudence, 58 
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 1, 3 (2007) (arguing that stretching interpretations to find mineral 
interests to avoid the rule against perpetuities is a bad precedent to set). 
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resolving the conflicting fractions issue.
198
  That case also considered 
whether the deed created a non-participating royalty rather than a mineral 
interest.
199
  The district court had agreed with the royalty determination 
for some of the interests, and invalidated them under the rule against 
perpetuities.
200
 
The Kansas Supreme Court, however, found it “unnecessary that we 
pass upon that question,” because it viewed the disputed interest as a 
mineral interest.
201
  In reaching its conclusion, the court invoked the 
estate misconception, a “redundancy analysis” reminiscent of the French 
opinion, and discounted the royalty label in deference to a recital in a 
mortgage and “some sixty other words.”202  With a nod to the rule against 
perpetuities’ destructive effect, the court held that the “defendant 
reserved an estate in real property which was vested in it upon delivery 
of the deed.  To hold otherwise would result in the destruction rather than 
the construction of the property interest intended to be reserved.”203 
In Drach v. Ely, a case decided twenty years after Shepard, the 
Kansas Supreme Court again avoided the rule against perpetuities by 
interpreting a grant as creating a non-participating mineral interest.
204
  In 
reviewing the court’s analysis, one commentator criticized the court for 
not having adopted a “more forthright” approach: 
 
  Ironically, the grantor’s express retention of these elements of a mineral 
interest helped to establish, in the court’s view, that the conveyed 
interests were mineral interests and not royalty interests.  The court 
concluded that the conveyance was of undivided shares of the mineral 
estate, nonparticipating in rentals and bonuses.  Consequently, the 
conveyance did not violate the rule against perpetuities, as it would 
have if the court had construed it to be the conveyance of royalty 
interests.  This result was prompted, in part, by the general view that 
courts should favor a construction that complies with the rule against 
perpetuities over one that violates the rule.  A more forthright approach 
would have been to overrule the Kansas view that perpetual 
                                                          
 198.   368 P.2d 19, 22–27 (Kan. 1962) (overturning the district court’s decision that the deed 
conveyed a royalty that violated the rule against perpetuities and instead held that a mineral interest 
was reserved). 
 199.  Id. at 24–27. 
 200.  Id. at 22. 
 201.  Id. at 22, 26. 
 202.  Id. at 23–27.  “Hence, had the parties intended the defendant to reserve only a royalty 
interest there would have been no necessity to make the reservation nonparticipating as to bonuses 
and delayed rentals since the plaintiffs would have been entitled to them as owners of the surface 
and of all the minerals in place in fee.”  Id. at 25. 
 203.  Id. at 26. 
 204.  Drach v. Ely, 703 P.2d 746, 751 (Kan. 1985). 
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nonparticipating royalty interests violate the rule against perpetuities.  
Kansas is alone in holding this view, which is unsupported by logic or 
policy.
205
 
a. Rucker v. DeLay: A Partial Retreat from the Rule Against 
Perpetuities Precedent 
The current oil and gas production boom provided the Kansas 
Supreme Court with another opportunity to overrule the Kansas view.  
Rucker v. DeLay, decided in 2012, involved a dispute over a reservation 
in a 1924 deed from landowners who sold their surface and minerals 
estate in Barber County,
206
 where “the future of the Kansas gas and oil 
industry is happening now.”207  The trial court had held that the reserved 
interest created a non-participating royalty interest.
208
  The appellate 
court agreed and “reluctantly” ruled the reserved interest was therefore 
void under Kansas rule against perpetuities precedent.
209
 
In reaching its decision in Rucker, the Kansas Supreme Court 
acknowledged calls to overrule Cosgrove and Lathrop.
210
  For example, 
Professor David Pierce filed a persuasive amicus curiae brief, in which 
he acknowledged that in order to preserve the stability of land titles, 
courts should not rush to overrule rules of property.
211
  However, because 
the Kansas view encouraged creative interpretations to avoid the 
unintended destruction of interests, he urged the court to correct the 
Cosgrove and Lathrop views on the rule against perpetuities’ application 
                                                          
 205.  Phillip E. DeLaTorre, Recent Developments in Kansas Oil and Gas Law (1983–1988), 37 
U. KAN. L. REV. 907, 925–26 (1989) (citations omitted).  I have urged courts to adopt a more 
forthright or pragmatic approach to the application of the rule against perpetuities to oil patch 
interests.  See Burney, A Pragmatic Approach, supra note 14, at 45 (criticizing courts for creatively 
avoiding the rule against perpetuities’ effects rather than openly exempting them from the rule). 
 206.   289 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Kan. 2012). 
 207.  See Gale Rose, Gov. Brownback Sees Current Oil and Gas Techniques During Barber 
County Visit, PRATT TRIBUNE (Sept. 28, 2011, 11:37 AM), 
http://www.pratttribune.com/article/20110928/NEWS/309289932 (proclaiming that, “[t]he future of 
the Kansas gas and oil industry is happening now in Barber County”). 
 208.  Rucker v. DeLay, 289 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Kan. 2012). 
 209.  Id. at 1169.  The reserved language provided: “The grantor herein reserves 60% of the land 
owner’s one-eighth interest to the oil, gas or other minerals that may hereafter be developed under 
any oil and gas lease made by the grantee or by his subsequent grantees.”  Id. at 1168. 
 210.  Id. at 1172. 
 211.  Brief of Amicus Curiae supra note 197, at *7.  
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to non-participating royalty interests.
212
 
In the end, Rucker only partially heeded calls to “right the ship” 
regarding the rule against perpetuities and non-participating royalty 
interests.  While the court recognized the errors of viewing production as 
the “vesting” event for non-participating royalty interests, it declined to 
“overrule our caselaw holding royalty interests created in a transferee are 
future interests that vest at production because that issue is not squarely 
before us.”213  Instead, the court held that the reserved royalty interest in 
the 1924 deed was vested, and therefore not subject to the rule against 
perpetuities.
214
 
In addition to an over-zealous exercise of judicial restraint, the 
court’s decision turned on a flawed analysis of the common law rule.  
The court begins by noting that as it developed at common law, the rule 
against perpetuities applies to certain future interests.
215
  By definition, a 
“future interest” is a presently owned non-possessory interest, which may 
become possessory in the future.
216
  According to the common law 
development of the rule, however, the rule against perpetuities applies 
only to certain future interests, contingent remainders and executory 
interests.
217
  The rule does not apply to other vested future interests.
218
  A 
                                                          
 212.  Id. at *8 (urging the court to take “necessary action to remedy the situation so Kansas 
district courts are not forced to address the issue on a case-by-case basis through reformation” under 
state statute). 
 213.  Rucker, 289 P.3d at 1173. 
 214.  See id. at 1172–73 (noting the criticism of the Kansas approach in that the rule against 
perpetuities does not apply to vested interests and subsequently not applying the rule against 
perpetuities to this reservation).  The court also noted that Kansas had adopted the Uniform Rule 
Against Perpetuities, which supersedes the common law rule; however, it applies only to interests 
created after 1992.  Id. at 1170.  Professor Pierce, however, argued in his brief, that the statute had 
broader application.  Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 197, at *8. 
 215.  See Rucker, 289 P.3d at 1170 (“The common-law rule against perpetuities ‘precludes the 
creation of any future interest in property which does not necessarily vest within twenty-one [21] 
years after a life or lives presently in being . . . .’”) (quoting Singer Co. v. Makad, Inc., 518 P.2d 493, 
496 (Kan. 1974)). 
 216.  See CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
REAL PROPERTY 125 (3d ed. 2002) (“[Future] interests have a present existence even though 
enjoyment of possession is postponed.”). 
 217.  Id. at 244.  For a discussion of the application of the rule against perpetuities to other oil-
patch interests, top leases and deeds, and reserved term interests, see generally Burney, A Pragmatic 
Approach, supra note 14, at 40–54 (outlining the history of the rule against perpetuities in the oil 
patch). 
 218.  The rule against perpetuities applies to contingent remainders and executory interests, but 
the rule will not void those interests if they vest, if at all, within 21 years from lives in being at the 
creation of the interest, which is Gray’s classic recitation of the rule against perpetuities.  See 
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classic example is the reversion retained by a grantor, who, owning an 
estate in fee simple, conveys only a life estate.  Because he conveyed less 
than the fee simple estate he owned, the grantor has retained a reversion, 
a vested interest, exempt from the rule against perpetuities’ 
application.
219
  The future interest label applies, not because the interest 
is not a presently-owned and vested interest, but because it will not 
become possessory until the future.  Other future interests exempt from 
the rule against perpetuities’ application include the possibility of 
reverter retained by the grantor of a fee simple determinable estate.
220
  In 
many jurisdictions, the oil and gas lease creates a fee simple 
determinable in the lessee, leaving the possibility of reverter in the 
lessor.
221
  The lessor’s interest is a vested future interest, an interest that 
becomes possessory only upon termination of the lease.
222
 
In sum, vested future interests, whether created by grant or 
reservation, are exempt from the rule against perpetuities’ application, a 
fact the Rucker opinion notes.
223
  Yet in the end the court retreated from 
the general vested category, and restricted its ruling to the exemption 
accorded to reversions, the interests retained by grantors.
224
  Because the 
interest at issue was reserved by the grantor, the court overruled 
Cosgrove and Lathrop only as to reserved interests.
225
  The court’s 
narrow holding guarantees more shale era disputes in Kansas over 
interests that may or may not be interpreted as non-participating royalty 
                                                          
MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra note 216, at 243 (espousing Gray’s classic recitation of the rule against 
perpetuities). 
 219.  When the life estate ends, the grantor assumes the right to possession, and his fee simple 
interest is complete.  See id. at 126–28 (summarizing the common law concept of reversions). 
 220.  1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL & GAS § 3.9(E), at 3-
78 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER] (noting that the 
possibility of reverter does not violate the rule against perpetuities). 
 221.  The classic phrase creating a fee simple determinable is “so long as.”  See MOYNIHAN & 
KURTZ, supra note 216, at 44 (“Typically, the fee simple determinable arises through the use of 
the . . . phrase[] ‘so long as . . . .’”).  Because that phrase appears in common oil and gas lease forms, 
early courts classified the lessee’s interest as a fee simple determinable, which is also a vested 
interest exempt from the rule.  See generally Burney, A Pragmatic Approach, supra note 14, at 40–
54 (citing early cases and decisions regarding the rule against perpetuities). 
 222.  See 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, supra note 220, at 3-78 (“[A] 
lessor . . . retains a vested possibility of reverter . . . .”). 
 223.  See Rucker, 289 P.3d at 1171 (reciting Gray’s classic recitation of the rule). 
 224.  See id. at 1173 (declining “to extend the [court’s prior vesting analysis] to royalty interests 
reserved in the grantor”). 
 225.  See id. (“[W]e need not determine in this case whether we should overrule our caselaw 
holding royalty interests created in a transferee are future interests that vest at production . . . .”). 
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interests.  When presented with another chance to “right the ship,”226 
which the court purported to do in Rucker, the Kansas Supreme Court 
should complete the process and view non-participating royalty interests 
as vested interests, whether created by grant or reservation, which are 
exempt from the rule against perpetuities’ application.  That view reflects 
common law precedent and the view of writers who uniformly argue that 
the rule against perpetuities has no business in the oil patch.
227
 
IV.  THE MEANING OF “MINERALS”: DOES IT INCLUDE OIL AND GAS? 
A. The Pennsylvania Problem: The Dunham Rule 
While Kansas courts grappled with applying the decades-old rule 
against perpetuities precedent to non-participating royalty interests in the 
shale era, Pennsylvania courts recently faced an 1882 case when 
examining the meaning of “minerals.”  In most jurisdictions, the term 
“minerals” includes oil and gas.228  Pennsylvania, however, formulated a 
different rule in Dunham v. Kirkpatrick.
229
  The Dunham rule has been 
recognized to allow a rebuttable presumption “if, in connection with a 
conveyance of land, there is a reservation or an exception of ‘minerals’ 
without any specific mention of natural gas or oil, . . . the word 
‘minerals’ was not intended by the parties to include natural gas or 
oil.”230  Addressing the Dunham rule in a 1960 case, Highland v. 
Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to depart from 
                                                          
 226.  Id. 
 227.  See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 197, at 7 (arguing that applying the rule 
against perpetuities to the defendants’ oil and gas lease would be an unnecessary expansion of the 
rule).  See generally Burney, A Pragmatic Approach, supra note 14, at 40–54 (describing the 
applicability of the rule against perpetuities to oil and gas leases in different jurisdictions).  Note that 
a Uniform Rule should help.  See id. (describing the problems with piecemeal exceptions to the rule 
against perpetuities that could be remedied by adopting a uniform exception to the rule against 
perpetuities for oil and gas leases). 
 228.  See McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346, 349–51 (Colo. 2000) (adopting the 
majority position and reviewing views taken by other courts, noting that “only a few jurisdictions in 
the eastern United States take the position that oil and gas are not included within the term 
‘minerals’”); HEMINGWAY, supra note 155, at 8 (“[A] majority of states have concluded that the 
term ‘minerals’ includes oil and gas . . . .”). 
 229.  See Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 40 (1882) (“[T]he words ‘all minerals,’ used in the 
exception and reservation in the article of agreement and the deed mentioned in the case stated, do 
not, in common and ordinary meaning, include petroleum.”). 
 230.  Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 65 A.3d 885, 888 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Highland v. 
Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390, 398–99 (Pa. 1960)). 
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this “rule of property”: 
 
  The [Dunham Rule] has been the law of [Pennsylvania] for [many 
years] and very many titles to land rest upon it.  It has become a rule of 
property and it will not be disturbed. . . .  [T]hat the word ‘minerals’ 
appears in a grant, rather than an exception or a reservation, in nowise 
alters the rule.
231
 
 
Predictably, property owners questioned the Dunham rule in a 
dispute over Marcellus shale gas.  Butler v. Charles Powers Estate 
involved the interpretation of a reservation in an 1881 deed of “minerals 
and Petroleum Oils.”232  The trial court had applied the Dunham rule and 
held this phrase did not include Marcellus gas.
233
  In remanding this 
ruling, the superior court sanctioned introduction of scientific and 
historic evidence about the Marcellus shale and the natural gas contained 
therein.
234
  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine 
“whether the Superior Court erred in remanding the case” to trial.235  As 
described below, on April 24, 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
decided the superior court had erred and reinstated the trial court’s 
ruling. 
                                                          
 231.  Highland, 161 A.2d at 398–99 (quoting Preston v. S. Penn Oil Co., 86 A. 203, 204 (Pa. 
1913)).  A vigorous dissent in Highland noted that: 
 
 In order to arrive at the conclusion reached by the Majority, one must find that 
practically everyone involved in writing conveyances, drafting Court orders, preparing 
documents and presenting exhibits desired to mock the English language, make sport of 
rules of grammar, distort the meaning of the simplest words, and ignore the sequence of 
cause and effect. . . . 
 We must do all these things, which deride the purpose of language, are cynical of the 
dictionary, do violence to logic, upset Court decisions, and, worst of all, establish a 
precedent which will puzzle the learned, confuse the unlearned, and introduce into the 
law of real estate a quality of instability as fugacious as the natural gas which is the 
subject of this lawsuit. 
 
Id. at 409 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also addressed the 
Dunham rule in a 1906 opinion, Silver v. Bush.  62 A. 832 (Pa. 1906) (affirming Dunham in that the 
reservation of “minerals” did not include petroleum and, therefore, also did not include natural gas). 
 232.  Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 29 A.3d 35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011). 
 233.  See id. at 42–43 (noting that the trial court held that, according to Dunham, “a reservation 
in a deed of ‘all minerals’ did not include petroleum oil”). 
 234.  Id. at 43. 
 235.  Order Granting Petition for Allowance of Appeal, 41 A.3d 854 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam). 
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1.  The “Public Reliance” Factor 
The Butler case had garnered attention among lawyers and 
laypeople, many reiterating the concern voiced in the Highland opinion: 
 
  If the Supreme Court were to revisit the Dunham Rule and modify it in 
any meaningful way, it would have the potential to cause significant 
chaos in the oil and gas industry in Pennsylvania. . . . People in 
Pennsylvania have understood that this is the way you wrote deeds 
since the 1880s.
236
 
2. Did Dunham Create a “Rule of Property” or a “Rule of 
Construction?”—Does it Matter? 
The views expressed above suggest that Pennsylvania courts and 
residents have viewed the Dunham rule as a rule of property.  As 
Professor Pierce noted in his amicus curiae brief in Rucker, courts should 
exercise restraint before overruling a rule of property.
237
  The 
justification for preserving such rules—as reflected in the concern about 
creating “chaos” in the quote above—is the need for certainty in drafting 
and interpreting titles.
238
  In light of the deference accorded to rules of 
                                                          
 236.  Sophia Pearson & Mike Lee, Pennsylvania High Court Takes Appeal on Marcellus Shale 
Rights, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-04-
05/pennsylvania-high-court-takes-appeal-on-Marcellus-Shale-rights; see also Dale A. Tice, Opening 
Pandora’s Box? Calling Shale Gas Rights into Question, 34 PA. LAW. 24 (Mar./Apr. 2012) 
(“Uncertainty is exactly what oil and gas lawyers in Pennsylvania are living with now following the 
Superior Court decision in Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 29 A.3d 35 (Pa. Super., Sept. 7, 
2011).”).  
 237.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 197, at *7 (“Rules of Property, Even ‘Bad’ Ones, 
Should Rarely Be Changed.”).  Regarding the rule against perpetuities’ application to non-
participating royalty interests, Professor Pierce argued that the Kansas courts had incorrectly applied 
the “rule of property.”  Id. at *4–5. 
 238.  See, e.g., Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, at 103 (Tex. 1984) (declining to 
overrule retroactively the “surface destruction” test for interpreting the phrase “other minerals” in 
light of public reliance on prior law); see also United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 
486–87 (1924) (‘“Where questions arise which affect titles to land, it is of great importance to the 
public that, when they are once decided, they should no longer be considered open.  Such decisions 
become rules of property, and many titles may be injuriously affected by their change.’” (quoting 
Minn. Mining Co. v. Nat’l Mining Co., 70 U.S. 332, 334 (1865))).  See generally Laura H. Burney, 
“Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals” Clauses in Texas: Who’s On First?, 41 SW. L.J. 695, 714 (1987) 
(discussing protection accorded to rules of property to protect property rights) [hereinafter Burney, 
Who’s On First].  For a general discussion of the difference between a “rule of property” and a “rule 
of construction” see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: FUTURE INTERESTS pt. III intro. note (1940) 
(noting that rules of property and rules of construction are distinct, but nevertheless “have certain 
points of contact and similarity”). 
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property, courts in general should consider whether rules affecting 
mineral titles fall in that category. 
Historically, courts have differentiated between rules of property and 
rules of construction.  “Rules of property” apply to set terms or words as 
a matter of law, regardless of the intent of the parties; a “rule of 
construction”, on the other hand, applies only as an interpretative aid for 
ascertaining the intent of the parties.
239
  Rules of property contribute to 
title stability because title examiners can confidently determine property 
rights from the four-corners of documents.  Rules of construction, by 
contrast, permit fact-finding determinations before meaning can be 
applied to the same terms appearing in different documents.
240
  However, 
such case-by-case determinations create uncertainty for drafters and title 
examiners. 
The rule against perpetuities discussed in the previous section 
provides a classic common law example of a rule of property.  The rule 
against perpetuities applies to certain interests, possibly leading to their 
invalidation, even if its application frustrates the intent of the parties.
241
  
Indeed, this intent frustrating feature fuels calls to reject certain rules of 
property.
242
  When courts or legislatures take this step, however, they 
                                                          
 239.   See MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra note 216, at 183 (noting that the Rule in Shelley’s Case 
was held “in accordance with the English view, [to be] a positive rule of law, not a rule of 
construction, that is, that its operation did not depend on the intention of the conveyor or testator but 
would apply, if its requirements were satisfied, regardless of the transferor’s intention”).  
 240.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 11.2 (2003) (outlining when extrinsic evidence can be used along with rules of construction to 
determine intent).  Another common law rule, the Doctrine of Worthier Title, was effectively 
converted from a rule of property to a rule of construction in a famous opinion written by Justice 
Cardozo in Doctor v. Hughes. 122 N.E. 221, 222 (N.Y. 1919) (noting that originally, the Doctrine of 
Worthier Title “was a rule, not of construction, but of property”).  “The importance of the court and 
the eminence of the judge who wrote the opinion gave the rule a prominence it had previously 
lacked and changing the rule from a positive rule of law to one of construction appeared to have the 
merit of effectuating the intention of the grantor.”  MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra note 216, at 197. 
 241.  As noted in the previous section, in light of the rule against perpetuities’ blanket 
application to certain non-vested interests, courts have avoided its application to non-participating 
royalty interests by viewing them as vested interests.  See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying 
text. 
 242.  A classic example from common law is the “Rule in Shelley’s Case.”  That rule provides 
that if a grant is made to a life tenant followed by a remainder in that life tenant’s heirs, the 
remainder is rewritten to create a vested remainder in the life tenant.  The point of the rule was to 
allow merger to occur, leaving the life tenant with a fee simple absolute.  Common law courts 
designed the rule to apply regardless of the parties’ intent to promote feudal policies that preferred 
fee simple estates.  When that rule crossed the Atlantic, states struggled with whether to overrule this 
“rule of property,” expressing concern that parties had relied on its ultimate effect.  Many courts 
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generally overrule them prospectively rather than retroactively.  The 
justification for a “prospective only” approach is the public’s reliance on 
rules and their effects on drafting and interpreting documents.
243
 
Although the Dunham rule has been viewed as a rule of property, the 
courts’ descriptions reflect a rule of construction by permitting 
consideration of parties’ intent.  The Dunham opinion states that the 
word “minerals” creates not a set meaning as a matter of law but “a 
rebuttable presumption that the grantor did not intend for ‘minerals’ to 
include natural gas or oil.”244  Highland’s reiteration of the rule in 1960 
expressly refers to it as both a rule of property and a rule of construction: 
“In [Dunham] this Court enunciated a rule of construction of the word 
‘minerals’ to be applied when determining the inclusion therein or the 
exclusion therefrom of natural gas or oil.  This decision established a rule 
of property . . . .”245  Yet Highland continues to describe not a set rule but 
a presumption rebuttable by “clear and convincing evidence that the 
parties to the conveyance intended to include natural gas or oil within 
such word.”246 
In Butler, the trial court adopted the rule of property view of 
Dunham.
247
  In appealing that ruling, the owners of the reserved 
“minerals” interest argued the trial court erred under that categorization 
                                                          
reluctantly applied Shelley’s Rule when raised by the words in conveyances, and awaited legislative 
action to overrule it.  See MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra note 216, at 181–91 (outlining the 
development and operation of the rule). 
 243.  See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.042 (West 2012) (abolishing the Rule in Shelley’s 
Case and stating that conveyances that took effect twenty years before the statute’s enactment will 
not be affected); Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103 (overruling the “surface destruction test” prospectively 
only in light of public’s reliance); see also Burney, Who’s On First, supra note 238, at 712–15 
(citing Great N.Y. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (1932)) (opining that courts should 
consider whether ruling affects title stability when deciding whether to overrule prospectively or 
retroactively).  In that article I argued that the Texas Supreme Court should have retroactively 
overruled the “surface destruction test” for determining whether the phrase “other minerals” 
included uranium because that test required factual inquiries; therefore, parties could not have relied 
on it as a matter of law.  Id. at 696.  The Dunham definition, however, arguably established a set, 
even if misguided, definition of the word “minerals.” 
 244.  Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 29 A.3d 35, 40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011), rev’d sub nom 
Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 65 A.3d 885 (Pa. 2013) (citing Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 
42 (1882) (doubting that the term mineral includes petroleum and stating that where a term’s 
meaning is doubtful, it must be construed against the grantor). 
 245.  Highland v. Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390, 398 (Pa. 1960). 
 246.  Id. at 399. 
 247.  See Butler, 29 A.3d at 37 (noting that the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s “request for a 
declaratory judgment that natural gas is included in the reservation of the deed”). 
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of the rule.
248
  First, they argued the Dunham rule, excluding gas from 
the word “minerals,” should not apply to the Butler deed since it pre-
dates the Dunham opinion by a year.
249
  In light of that chronology, the 
argument that drafters relied on Dunham’s definition as a rule of 
property could lose force.
250
  Second, the “minerals” owners 
distinguished Dunham, arguing it involved conventional rather than shale 
gas, “and no Pennsylvania decision has decided that mineral rights 
exclude Marcellus shale.”251  In remanding, the superior court focused on 
that second point: 
 
  The Dunham and Highland decisions do not end the analysis, absent a 
more sufficient understanding of whether, inter alia (1) Marcellus shale 
constitutes a ‘mineral’; (2) Marcellus shale gas constitutes the type of 
conventional natural gas contemplated in Dunham and Highland; and 
(3) Marcellus shale is similar to coal to the extent that whoever owns 
the shale, owns the shale gas.
252
 
3.  Butler v. Charles Powers Estate: Reaffirming Dunham for the Shale 
Era 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to review the superior 
court’s Butler ruling on April 3, 2012.253  A year later, the supreme court 
reinstated the trial court’s ruling, determining that “the Dunham Rule has 
now been an unaltered, unwavering rule of property law for 131 years; 
indeed its origins actually date back to the [1836] Gibson decision, 
                                                          
 248.  See id. at 38 (noting that the only issue raised on appeal was “whether . . . [the trial court] 
erred in determining that the . . . reservation in the chain of title to the surface land currently owned 
by . . . appellees did not include a reservation of one half of such unconventional Marcellus shale gas 
as might be found under the land”). 
 249.  Reply Brief of Appellants, at *3–4, Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 29 A.3d 35 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2011) (No. 1795 MDA 2010), 2011 WL 3342735.  In fact, the owners of the reserved “minerals” 
argue that prior to Dunham the word included natural gas.  Id.  They also note that the Highland 
deeds were executed after the Dunham decision; therefore, neither case is controlling.  Id. at *5. 
 250.  See id. at *3 (“The significance of this sequence is that, as of the date of the deed and the 
subject reservation, the Dunham decision was totally unknown to the scrivener who wrote the 
subject reservation.  Had the scrivener been a close and diligent student of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, he or she could never have imagined that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
create such a glaring departure from so many years of contract and deed construction.”). 
 251.  Butler, 29 A.3d at 39. 
 252.  Id. at 43.  The “minerals” owners relied on U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 
1983), which held that coalbed methane gas belongs to the owner of the coal.  Id.  Similarly, the 
“minerals” owners in Butler claimed that the owners of the shale owned the shale gas.  Id. 
 253.  Order Granting Petition for Allowance of Appeal, supra note 235. 
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placing the rule’s age at 177 years.”254  Having clarified that the Dunham 
rule predated the 1882 Dunham decision, the court rejected the claim that 
the rule should not apply to the 1881 deed in Butler.
255
  Additionally, 
while the court repeatedly applied the rule of property moniker, it 
continued to recognize that the Dunham rule permits consideration of 
parol evidence of the parties’ intent when executing the deed.256 
As explained above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s definition of 
Dunham reflects a rule of construction, which opens the door to case-by-
case decisions that detract from title stability.
257
  A concurring justice 
recognized this distinction.  Although that justice viewed Dunham as 
“cryptic, conclusory, and highly debatable,”258 Justice Saylor focused on 
the extent of public reliance and would have clarified its “rule of 
property” status: “In this regard, on account of Dunham’s shortcomings, 
I find the ‘rule of property law’ denominator more accurate than a 
characterization of Dunham as a sustainable effort to assess the actual 
intentions of the parties to a conveyance.”259 
The concurring justice also appeared to note another option, 
discussed above,
260
 for replacing cryptic rules with those that promote 
title stability: ruling prospectively only from the date of the opinion.
261
  
                                                          
 254.  Butler, 65 A.3d at 897.  The Gibson case to which the court refers was decided in 1836. 
 255.  See id. at 898 (“[I]n 1881, the law of Pennsylvania was Gibson . . . .”). 
 256.  See id. (“[T]he rule in Pennsylvania is that natural gas and oil simply are not minerals . . . .  
[The intention to include natural gas within the deed reservation] may only be shown through parol 
evidence . . . .”). 
 257.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
 258.  Id. at 899 (Saylor, J., concurring).  
 259.  Id. at 900 n.1.  
 260.  See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text (arguing that the historical understanding 
of “rules of property” should be given great deference because many people relied on that 
understanding of the rules). 
 261.  See id. at 900 (noting that in light of the public reliance on Dunham, the court could not 
overrule it retroactively).  Rules and statutes that affect titles are often restricted by dates.  See, e.g., 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-1-111 (1993) (defining “coal,” “gas,” and “oil,” prospectively from 1993); 
Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103 (limiting ruling prospectively to deeds executed after date of opinion).  
Arkansas followed a trek similar to Pennsylvania’s with the Strohacker doctrine, which limited the 
meaning of conveyances of “valuable mineral deposits” to minerals “known to be valuable at the 
time of the grant.”  Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Strohacker, 152 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Ark. 1941) (holding that 
the reservation of “all coal and mineral deposits” in 1892 was ineffective to reserve oil and gas).  A 
recent Arkansas Supreme Court case, however, narrowed that doctrine and adopted a date-specific 
approach for the meaning of “minerals.”  See Staggs v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 11-902, 2012 WL 
1222225, at *5 (Ark. Apr. 12, 2012) (noting that “between 1905 and 1937, it became common 
knowledge in Arkansas that a reservation of mineral rights included oil and gas”); see also Jamie G. 
Moss, Comment, The Strohacker Doctrine: Its Application in Arkansas Courts and the Need for an 
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Indeed, the Butler dispute presented the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
with the opportunity to change the law prospectively and adopt an 
expansive definition of the term “minerals,” one that includes oil, and 
gas, including Marcellus gas.
262
  A broad definition of minerals, as 
scholars and courts have explained, decreases litigation and increases 
title stability, which should be the guiding goal in the shale era.
263
  
However, the concurring justice viewed that approach as unnecessary for 
                                                          
Updated Rule, 64 ARK. L. REV. 1095, 1118–19 (2011) (urging courts to adopt a date-specific “bright 
line” rule to ensure title stability and encourage leasing in the current shale boom). 
 262.  Writers support an expansive definition of the term “minerals” or “other minerals.”  See, 
e.g., Eugene O. Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 WYO. L.J. 107, 112–13 
(1948), reprinted in 34 OKLA. L. REV. 28, 34–35 (1981) (“Since the enjoyment of oil and gas is 
through extraction, it should be considered to be within a general grant or reservation of the 
minerals.”).  Interpreting “minerals” and “gas” as broadly as possible would also promote title 
stability.  See Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 694 P.2d 299, 307 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (“To 
alleviate these problems, many courts find the term minerals to be unambiguous.  Under this 
approach title uncertainty is minimized and courts are able to avoid the tortuous process of 
attempting to discover the parties’ specific intent.”); see also KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
OIL AND GAS, supra note 13, at 384 (promoting the idea that when there is a general severance the 
entire estate should be severed to promote stability); LOWE, supra note 13, at 496 (preferring an 
expansive definition of “other minerals” because it avoids case-by-case searches for the parties’ 
intent).  Idaho recently had the chance to do just this and instead found the term “minerals” 
ambiguous instead of excluding geothermal resources from the definition.  See Ida-Therm, LLC v. 
Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 293 P.3d 630, 633–36 (Idaho 2012).  On the contrary, a recent West 
Virginia opinion stressed the need to promote title stability in overruling a 1923 case that had 
required viewing the word “surface” as ambiguous, and instead adopted a broad definition of that 
term.  Faith United Methodist Church & Cemetery of Terra Alta v. Morgan, 745 S.E.2d 461, 464 
(W. Va. 2013) (overruling Ramage v. S. Penn Oil Co., 118 S.E. 162 (W. Va. 1923)).  
 263.  In a different context the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted “minerals” more 
broadly.  See Joseph Iole, May Two Laws Occupy the Same Space at the Same Time? Understanding 
Pennsylvania Preemption Law in the Marcellus Shale Context, 6 APPALACHIAN NAT. RES. L.J. 39, 
42 (2011–2012).  Iole notes that:  
 Because the debates are so nuanced, some contests among the ever-changing cast of 
characters (each somehow involved in or affected by gas extraction from the Marcellus 
shale) have led to peculiar results.  For example, one contest involves the interpretation of 
“mineral extraction.”  In Huntley & Huntley v. Borough Council of Oakmont [sic], the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the Commonwealth Court’s finding that natural gas 
drilling falls within the category of “mineral extraction,” leading to the determination that 
the Borough had to grant a special use permit for the drilling activity.  Counter-
intuitively, when determining property rights from certain mineral leases, “minerals” 
could take on a nuanced definition that does not include natural gas.  This assault on 
logical consistency, which is generally a by-product of the legal objective to determine 
the drafter’s intent, could also illustrate that not all contests in the “oil and gas 
development” have the same stakes involved.  Whether debating property rights or 
intrastate preemption, it is important to identify the interested parties.  
Id. at 42–43.  
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this reason: the effects of the Dunham decision can easily be avoided 
with careful drafting.
264
  In fact, drafters can and have avoided Dunham’s 
dictates by expressly mentioning oil and gas.  For example, in a recent 
Marcellus shale case, Kowcheck v. Pittsburgh Terminal Realization 
Corp., the court held that Dunham was irrelevant to the interpretation of 
a 1946 deed that reserved “all oil and gas under said tracts of land 
together with the right and privilege of drilling and removing said oil and 
gas . . . .’”265 
Rather than alter Dunham prospectively, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court in Butler retained and reaffirmed the Dunham rule.
266
  In the 
process, the court repeated rule of construction verbiage.  However, its 
restrictive approach permits rule of property effects.  Specifically, the 
court emphasized that overcoming the Dunham presumption requires 
“clear and convincing” evidence of the parties’ intent, and not other 
evidence at the time the deed was executed—a difficult burden for 
parties to meet.
267
  Another recent Marcellus shale dispute from 
Pennsylvania illustrates not only the difficulty of this burden but courts’ 
preference to avoid fact-based inquiries about intent.  In Elbow Fish & 
Game Club, Inc. v. Guillaume Business Opportunity Group, the court 
rejected pleas to await the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Butler.
268
  Instead, the court concluded that summary judgment was 
                                                          
 264.  See Butler, 65 A.3d at 900 (Saylor, J., concurring) (“Finally, I note that, in terms of modern 
conveyances, the parties certainly have the ability to negate the impact of the Dunham decision by 
making their intentions clear on the face of the written instrumentation.  This lessens the need for 
this Court to consider fashioning a new, prospective rule.”). 
 265.  See Kowcheck v. Pittsburgh Terminal Realization Corp., No. 2009-4328, 2011 WL 
9753960, at *3 (Pa. Com. Pl. Civil Div. Nov. 14, 2011) (noting that, unlike the deed at issue in 
Dunham, the deed in the instant case does not require interpretation of the term “all minerals”).  This 
opinion relies on a 1996 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case that had analyzed a deed that expressly 
referred to oil and gas.  Id. (citing Sheaffer v. Caruso, 676 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1996)).  In Kowcheck, the 
plaintiffs had argued that “gas” did not include Marcellus shale gas since that gas would have been 
unknown to the parties when the deed was executed.  Id.  The court rejected that view.  See id. 
(“Here, the reservation language in the 1946 deed specifically reserves ‘all oil and gas under said 
tracts of land’.  Thus, there is no issue as to whether the gas rights were excepted and reserved by the 
deed.”). 
 266.  Butler, 65 A.3d at 899 (noting that the facts did not support deviating from the Dunham 
analysis and affirming the lower court’s decision under Dunham). 
 267.  Id. (holding that “under the Dunham Rule, the trial court correctly concluded on the 
averments of record that Marcellus shale natural gas was not contemplated by the private deed 
reservation presented in this case”).  The court also rejected claims that its rulings regarding 
ownership of coalbed methane gas, or that the methods of producing Marcellus shale natural gas, 
required it to depart from Dunham.  Id. 
 268.  No. 12-00825, 2013 WL 1364007 (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar. 25, 2013). 
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proper when the parties admitted that “all parties to the 1928 transaction 
have passed and that no direct evidence of the parties’ intent exists.”269  
In its conclusion, the court reemphasized the significance of the Dunham 
rule, and described it with rule of property parameters: “Many titles to 
land within the Commonwealth rest upon the Dunham rule; this Court 
will abide by this long-standing rule of property until otherwise advised 
by our appellate courts.”270  In light of the Butler decision, courts in 
Pennsylvania have been advised that the Dunham rule reigns in that 
state—whether viewed as a rule of property or rule of construction—for 
drafting and resolving title disputes involving the meaning of “minerals” 
in the shale era. 
V. THE EXECUTIVE RIGHT AND CORRESPONDING DUTY: LESLEY V. 
VETERANS LAND BOARD 
As evidenced in the discussion of Butler, courts should consider 
public reliance on prior law in rulings that affect property rights.  
However, a recent Texas opinion, Lesley v. Veterans Land Board,
271
 fails 
to address that concern despite claims that it marked a turning point from 
prior law.
272
  That prior law consists of cases defining the duty owed by 
executives to non-executive owners.  As with other perennial title issues 
discussed above, most executive-duty law emanates from Texas cases.
273
  
                                                          
 269.  Id. at *6. 
 270.  Id. at *14–15. 
 271.  352 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2011).  The author served as appellate counsel for the developer in 
this case and argued on its behalf in the Texas Supreme Court. 
 272.  See Christopher S. Kulander, The Executive Right to Lease Mineral Real Property in Texas 
Before and After Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 529, 556 (2013) (noting 
Lesley departed from prior law); see also J. Robert Beatty and Monika Ehrman, The Nature of the 
Severed Executive Right, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS CLE 26 (2004) (noting before the Texas Supreme 
Court revisited In re Bass in Lesley that “[u]nder current Texas law, an executive does not breach a 
fiduciary duty to the non-executive if the executive does not exercise his right to execute an oil and 
gas lease”). 
 273.  In other states, extensive compulsory pooling statutes render the executive duty less 
significant.  Texas’s statute is not as comprehensive; therefore, in Texas, leases executed by 
executive right owners, plus the pooling clauses in those leases are key for field-wide development.  
See Laura H. Burney, The Texas Supreme Court and Oil and Gas Jurisprudence: What Hath 
Wagner & Brown v. Sheppard Wrought?, 5 TEX. J. OF OIL, GAS, AND ENERGY L. 219, 225 (2010) 
[hereinafter Burney, The Texas Supreme Court and Oil].  The Texas Supreme Court and Oil 
provides:  
 
 Forming pooled units is essential in the oil and gas industry . . . .  For that reason, 
most major producing states long ago passed compulsory pooling acts.  Notoriously slow 
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However, because these cases sent mixed messages, writers have 
recognized lingering uncertainty and have urged courts to provide 
clarification about the scope of the duty.
274
  Lesley, a shale era case, 
provided the Texas Supreme Court with that opportunity.
275
 
A. The Mixed Messages Regarding the Duty: Fiduciary or Utmost Good 
Faith? 
The Lesley opinion begins with the bundle of sticks analogy: “The 
right to lease minerals—the executive right—is one ‘stick’ in the bundle 
of five real property rights that comprise a mineral estate.”276  
Concerning the corresponding duty, the court initially notes that it “held 
long ago that the executive owes . . . a duty of ‘utmost fair dealing,’” but 
that it has “seldom had occasion to elaborate.”277  However, in prior 
cases, notably the notorious 1984 case Manges v. Guerra,
278
 the court 
                                                          
to follow that path, Texas passed an act in 1965 known as the Mineral Interest Pooling 
Act (‘MIPA’).  Unlike acts in other states, however, authorities view the MIPA as limited 
in function, less a compulsory act than an act to encourage voluntary pooling.  In fact, in 
Texas pooled units formed pursuant to the MIPA are relatively rare.   
 
Id. See generally 3 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS 
§ 12.5 (2011) (noting the restricted nature of the Mineral Interest Pooling Act as compared to 
compulsory pooling acts in other states).  Additionally, statutes governing development on state and 
federal lands generally preempt executive duty case law by mandating leasing practices and duties.  
See, e.g., Patrick H. Martin, Unbundling the Executive Right: A Guide to Interpretation of the Power 
to Lease and Develop Oil and Gas Interests, 37 NAT. RES. J. 311, 389 (1997) (describing that 
separate from case law, “Texas has a unique arrangement for certain of its public lands that are the 
subject of the Relinquishment Act”); see also State v. Durham, 860 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Tex. 1993) 
(holding that under the Relinquishment Act, which names the surface owner an agent for the state in 
leasing, the owner owes a fiduciary duty). 
 274.  See Ernest E. Smith, Implications of a Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for the Holder of the 
Executive Right, 64 TEX. L. REV. 371, 406 (1985) (concluding that even after Manges, “[i]t may not, 
however, be too late to argue for a lesser standard than that of a fiduciary”); Norvell, supra note 104, 
at 981 (noting the “uncertainty that lingers as to the Manges decision’s effect on the standard of 
care”). 
 275.  See Andarko Petroleum Corp. v. BNW Prop. Co., 393 S.W.3d 846, 850–52 (Tex. App. 
2012) (noting that discovery of the Barnett shale prompted non-executives to sue executives in 
Lesley). 
 276.  352 S.W.3d at 480–81. 
 277.  Id. at 481 (citing Schlittler v. Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. 1937)). 
 278.   673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).  A year after the court decided the case, Professor Ernest 
Smith concluded that, “[a] case with the notoriety of Manges should not set the standard for 
landowners whose acquisition and use of the executive right involve none of the elements of 
overreaching apparently present in that case.”  Smith, supra note 274, at 406.  For a sample of the 
many articles discussing Manges, see, e.g., Douglas Martin, Clinton Manges, Volatile Texas Oilman 
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had elaborated by combining the fiduciary label with the lower standard, 
“utmost good faith.”279  The court’s use of that label has created 
confusion and elicited criticism.  Applied in its traditional sense, that 
label suggests executives owe the high level of duty imposed in trust and 
agency relationships.
280
  That standard would require executives to 
subordinate their interests to the non-executives, a requirement 
commentators criticized as “onerous” and as a “deviation” from the 
utmost good faith standard previously adopted by Texas courts and 
courts of other jurisdictions.
281
 
B. In re Bass (Tex. 2003): No Duty to Lease, But No “Self-Dealing” 
When Leasing 
In a 2003 opinion, In re Bass, the court appeared to clarify that the 
duty established in Manges was not as “onerous” as the fiduciary label 
implied.
282
  Bass reached the court through a discovery dispute.
283
  
Specifically, the non-executives, owners of a two percent non-
participating royalty interest in a 22,000 acre ranch, sought to review 
seismic information obtained by Bass, the owner of the surface and 
                                                          
and Rancher, Dies at 87, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/business/29manges.html?_r=0; Ken Case, Blind Justice: Is 
There Anything Wrong with a Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas Helping Out a Close Friend?, 
15 TEX. MONTHLY 136 (1987). 
 279.  Manges, 673 S.W.2d at 183–84 (using the label “fiduciary duty” to refer to the duty of 
utmost good faith in the court’s discussion of  Manges’ self-dealing).  “Until the Texas Supreme 
Court’s decision in Manges v. Guerra, the utmost good faith standard had not been considered to 
create a fiduciary duty.”  Mims v. Beall, 810 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex. App. 1991) (internal citation 
omitted).  For a thorough discussion and criticism of the court’s use of the fiduciary label in Manges, 
see Smith, supra note 274, at 406 (noting that Texas cases and most jurisdictions hold executives to 
the lower standard of care, utmost good faith, rather than a fiduciary standard). 
 280.  See Smith, supra note 274, at 372–73 (noting that fiduciary duties are on the high end of 
the standard of behavior scale).  For a recent opinion thoroughly reviewing Texas case law and the 
issues raised by a court’s use of the fiduciary label, see generally Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin. LLC, 
395 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. App. 2013), reh’g granted.  
 281.  Smith, supra note 274, at 406 (describing the fiduciary standard for executives as 
“onerous” and as a “deviation” from prior law); see also Martin, supra note 273, at 396 (“Most 
writers have found that the nature of the oil and gas business does not warrant a fiduciary standard 
because the parties themselves do not suppose themselves to be establishing a fiduciary 
relationship.”). 
 282.  113 S.W.3d 735, 745 (Tex. 2003). 
 283.  Id. at 737 (noting that the issues in the case involve whether seismic data was protected 
from disclosure as trade secrets). 
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minerals (the executive).
284
  The court first determined that the 
information was a trade secret and not discoverable, unless the non-
participating royalty interest owners could prove that discovery was 
necessary for a fair adjudication of their claim.
285
  The court decided no 
necessity existed because the executive owed no duty to the non-
executives until a lease was executed.
286
 
In asserting their right to review the seismic information, the non-
executives had relied on Manges.
287
  However, in Bass the court adopted 
a restrictive and fact-specific view of that 1984 case: 
 
  Manges purchased one-half of the mineral estate and executive leasing 
rights from the Guerra family with the Guerras retaining the other 50% 
ownership interest in the mineral estate.  The Guerras sued Manges for 
self-dealing in leasing a portion of the estate to himself at unfair terms.  
We stated that ‘[a] fiduciary duty arises from the relationship of the 
parties . . . [t]hat duty requires the holder of the executive right, Manges 
in this case, to acquire for the non-executive every benefit that he 
exacts for himself.  Accordingly, we held that Manges breached his 
fiduciary duty to the Guerras by making a lease to himself under 
numerous unfair terms. . . .  Because Manges held that the executive 
owes the non-executive a fiduciary duty, the [non-executives] correctly 
state that Bass owes them a duty to acquire every benefit for [them] that 
Bass would acquire for himself.  What differentiates this case from 
Manges, however, is that no evidence of self-dealing exists here.  Bass 
has not leased his land to himself or anyone else. . . .  Thus, the present 
facts are distinguishable from Manges.
288
 
 
Following In re Bass, commentators concluded that an executive 
owed no affirmative duty to lease, but when executing a lease, the 
executive must avoid self-dealing.
289
  Instances of self-dealing include 
leasing arrangements by executives designed to prevent non-executives 
                                                          
 284.  Id. at 738. 
 285.  Id. at 742–43. 
 286.  Id. at 743. 
 287.  Id. at 744 (stating that the McGills relied on the Manges proposition that a mineral estate 
owner has a duty to develop the mineral estate). 
 288.  Id. at 744–45 (citations omitted). 
 289.  1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 2.6(C)(4), at 
2-94 to -95 (2d ed. 2013) (noting that decisions subsequent to Manges had “refused to impose this 
level of diligence on the executive” and describing In re Bass as implying that the executive “is 
barred from obtaining a benefit for himself that is not shared with the nonexecutives” and that “there 
is no independent duty to lease, even though failure to do so may deprive the nonexecutives of any 
financial benefit from their interest”); Beatty and Ehrman, supra note 272, at 26 (noting that before 
the Texas Supreme Court revisited In re Bass in Lesley, “[u]nder current Texas law, an executive 
does not breach a fiduciary duty to the non-executive if the executive does not exercise his right to 
execute an oil and gas lease”). 
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from sharing in higher bonuses and royalty rates.
290
  Courts also relied on 
In re Bass in concluding that executives did not owe an affirmative duty 
to lease and that the duty was not triggered until a lease had been 
executed.
291
  One of those cases was Lesley v. Veterans Land Board.
292
 
C. Lesley v. Veterans Land Board (Tex. 2011) 
1. Facts 
In 1998 Bluegreen (“the developer”), bought for two million dollars 
about 4,100 acres of land in North Texas that the Lesleys and others 
(collectively, “the Lesleys”) had conveyed to the developer’s 
predecessor.
293
  The Lesleys’ deed reserved a fraction of the minerals 
they already owned but conveyed all of the surface, remaining minerals, 
and “the ‘full, complete and sole right to execute oil, gas and minerals 
leases’” to the developer.294  After the conveyances, the Lesleys became 
non-executives who owned fractional non-participating royalty interests.  
The developer owned the surface, the remaining fractional mineral 
interests in the property, and all of the executive rights.  The developer 
developed the property into a residential subdivision, Mountain Lakes, 
imposed deed restrictions, and sold 1700 lots to various buyers, including 
the Veterans Land Board.
295
  In the deed to the buyers, the developer did 
not reserve the executive rights or minerals; therefore, the lot owners 
obtained a fractional share of minerals, including the corresponding 
                                                          
 290.  See, e.g., Luecke v. Wallace, 951 S.W.2d 267, 274–75 (Tex. App. 1997) (finding a breach 
of duty when executive leased to solely-owned company for 1/8 royalty and $50 an acre bonus and 
then assigned lease to original offeror for 1/5 royalty and $150 an acre bonus). 
 291.  See, e.g., Aurora Petroleum, Inc. v. Newton, 287 S.W.3d 373, 376–77 (Tex. App. 2009) 
(“[T]here is no existing oil and gas lease. Therefore, there can be no implied duty to develop . . . .”); 
Hlavinka v. Hancock, 116 S.W.3d 412, 420 (Tex. App. 2003) (“[T]he executive did not breach a 
fiduciary duty to the non-executives without having exercised his executive power.”).  In Lesley, the 
Texas Supreme Court disapproves of both of these opinions.  Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 
352 S.W.3d 479, 491 n.78 (Tex. 2011). 
 292.  352 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2011). 
 293.  Veterans Land Bd. of Tex. v. Lesley, 281 S.W.3d 602, 609 (Tex. App. 2009). 
 294.  Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 481. 
 295.  Id. at 481–82.  The Veterans Land Board (VLB) asserted that sovereign immunity barred 
the non-executives’ lawsuit against it; both the court of appeals and the Texas Supreme Court agreed 
with the VLB.  Id. at 484. 
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executive rights in their lots.
296
 
Seven years later, when the Barnett shale was booming, the Lesleys 
sued claiming the executives—the developer and the lot owners—had 
breached duties owed to them.
297
  The trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Lesleys, which included rulings that the 
executives had breached their duties by (1) imposing deed restrictions 
that prohibited drilling, and (2) by failing to lease.
298
 
 
 
 
2. Court of Appeals 
 
The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court’s rulings regarding 
the duty owed by the executives.
299
  Relying on In re Bass and its 
interpretation of Manges, the court held the executives’ duties had not 
been triggered since they had not leased the minerals.
300
  Overall, the 
court found that the developer had acted properly by executing deeds of 
trust covering the surface and by imposing deed restrictions that 
prohibited drilling.
301
  In rejecting the Lesleys’ analogies to Manges, the 
court stated that “the facts in this case are nothing like the facts in 
                                                          
 296.  The appellate court and the Texas Supreme Court opinions each relied on Day v. Texland 
Petroleum, 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990), in deciding that the developer had not reserved executive 
rights when it sold each lot.  Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 486–87; Lesley, 281 S.W.3d at 616.  The trial 
court, however, had ruled that the executive rights remained with the developer.  Lesley, 281 S.W.3d 
at 612.  The appellate and supreme court opinions also agreed that the right to develop was conveyed 
with the executive right, rejecting the non-executives’ claim that they maintained the right to 
develop.  Id. at 620; Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 486–87.  For an argument that the right to develop should 
be viewed as separate from the executive right see Kulander, supra note 272, at 576–77. 
 297.  Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 482 (“While Mountain Lakes was being developed, so was the 
Barnett Shale, a hydrocarbon-producing geological formation underlying this part of North Texas 
and possibly this subdivision.”); see also Andarko Petroleum Corp. v. BNW Prop. Co., 393 S.W.3d 
846, 850–51 (Tex. App. 2012) (noting that discovery of Barnett shale prompted the non-executives 
to sue executives in Lesley). 
 298.  Lesley, 281 S.W.3d at 612. 
 299.  Id. at 618–19.  The court agreed that the developer had conveyed executive rights to the lot 
owners.  Id. at 617. 
 300.  Id. at 619. 
 301.  Id.  The non-executives had tried to equate the deeds of trust executed by the developer to 
those executed in Manges, but the court disagreed: “In Manges, the executive’s deed of trust covered 
all mineral interests, including the executive right. . . .  However, the deeds of trust that [the 
developer] executed did not purport to cover any mineral interests.”  Id.  Moreover, the court held 
that executing deeds of trust and imposing deed restrictions, even if construed as an exercise of the 
executive right, did not breach the duty owed to the non-executives.  Id. at 620. 
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Manges.”302  Instead, the court focused on the parties’ original bargain 
when the developer bought the property and all of the executive rights in 
1998: 
 
  This case involves an arms-length transaction between the Lesley 
Appellees and [the developer].  [The developer] wanted to obtain 
property for the purpose of developing a residential subdivision . . . .  
The Lesley Appellees certainly knew that a residential developer would 
not want drilling or other similar activities to take place on the surface 
area in the subdivision.  With that knowledge, the Lesley Appellees 
sold the property to [the developer] for about $2,000,000.  The Lesley 
Appellees could have negotiated to retain the executive rights . . . .  
Instead, the Lesley Appellees willingly conveyed the executive 
rights . . . .  Based on the facts in this case . . . [the executives] did not 
breach a fiduciary duty to [the non-executives].
303
 
 
Although the appellate court continued to use the fiduciary label, it 
adopted the restrictive view of that term reflected in In re Bass.  In 
Lesley, the Texas Supreme Court, however, rejected not only the 
appellate court’s rulings, but also its view of In re Bass and Manges. 
3. Texas Supreme Court Opinion 
Before addressing the legal questions, the court acknowledged shale-
era economics: 
 
  While Mountain Lakes was being developed, so was the Barnett 
Shale . . . .  Almost all the surrounding area came under lease for oil 
and gas production.  There is evidence that Mountain Lakes is sitting 
on $610 million worth of minerals that, in large part, cannot be reached 
from outside the subdivision.
304
 
                                                          
 302.  Id. at 619. 
 303.  Id. at 619–20.  In stressing that the non-executives should not have sold the executive 
rights, the court noted, “had the Lesley Appellees retained the executive rights . . . the restriction 
against mineral development would not prohibit them from exercising the rights.”  Id. at 629 n.12 
(citing Prop. Owners of Leisure Land, Inc. v. Woolf & Magee, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. App. 
1990) (“The mineral owner, having the dominant estate, cannot be limited by subdivision restrictions 
imposed by surface owners after the estate is severed.”). 
 304.  Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Tex. 2011).  For another recent 
Texas Supreme Court opinion expressing pro-development sentiments in its analysis see Coastal Oil 
& Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 15–17 (Tex. 2008) (finding the rule of capture 
prevented recovery for trespass based on allegations that hydraulic fracturing crossed lease lines).  
“The experts in this case agree on two important things.  One is that hydraulic fracturing is not 
optional; it is essential to the recovery of oil and gas in many areas . . . .  (This fact has recently been 
brought to the public’s attention because of development in the Barnett shale in north Texas, which 
is entirely dependent on hydraulic fracturing.).”  Id. at 16. 
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The court’s opinion contains no citation following this sentence, and 
the executives argued the evidence did not support that claim.
305
  
Moreover, the executives noted they had not turned down offers to lease 
because they had not received any offers.
306
  Nonetheless, the court 
reversed the court of appeals and found the executives had breached their 
duties in Lesley. 
a. A Retreat from In re Bass: The Duty Arises Prior to Leasing and 
May Require Leasing 
As noted above, the court of appeals in Lesley had relied on In re 
Bass in ruling that the executive duty had not been triggered because no 
leases had been executed.  The Texas Supreme Court, however, 
emphasized the unique facts of that earlier opinion and then concluded it 
cannot “be read to shield the executive from liability for all inaction.”307  
However, although the court disapproved of decisions that had held there 
was no affirmative duty to lease, it stopped short of imposing such a 
requirement.  Instead, the court held: 
 
  It may be that an executive cannot be liable to the non-executive for 
failing to lease minerals when never requested to do so, but an 
executive’s refusal to lease must be examined more carefully.  If the 
refusal is arbitrary or motivated by self-interest to the non-executive’s 
detriment, the executive may have breached his duty.
308
 
b. Anti-Drilling Restrictions Cancelled as Remedy for Breach of 
                                                          
 305.  Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 482; see also Respondent Bluegreen Southwest One, L.P.’s Motion 
for Rehearing at 1 n.1, Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2011) (No. 09-
0306), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/ebriefs/09/09030618.pdf (“The evidence 
regarding the value of the mineral estate consists of one affidavit supplied by [non-executives] in a 
motion for summary judgment, provided at a time when gas prices were high and speculation 
regarding the Barnett shale production was high.  The Affidavit that is in the record does not take 
into account whether or not the Barnett shale formation is constant throughout the Property and is a 
‘best guess’ at value and overstates the value.  None of the [executives] ever received an offer to 
lease the Property for any amount of money.”). 
 306.  Motion for Rehearing, supra note 305, at 1 n.1; see also Oral Argument at 28:18, Lesley v. 
Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2011) (No. 09-0306), 2010 WL 3713693. 
 307.  Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 491 (“While there was an allegation of self-interest in Bass, we 
concluded that it was not sufficiently supported by the record to warrant compelling discovery of 
privileged information.”). 
 308.  Id. (disapproving of Aurora Petroleum, Inc. v. Newton, 287 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. App. 2009) 
and Hlavinka v. Hancock, 116 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App. 2003)). 
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Executive Duty 
While the Texas Supreme Court recognized that the developer had 
“acquired the executive right for the specific purpose of protecting the 
subdivision,” it struck the deed restrictions it had imposed.309  Relying on 
Manges, the court found the developer had breached its duty, which it 
still referred to as fiduciary, by imposing the deed restrictions.
310
  The 
court concluded “the common law provides appropriate protection to the 
surface owner through the accommodation doctrine.”311  That court-
created doctrine provides some protection to pre-existing surface uses 
against mineral estate dominance in Texas, one of the few major-
producing states without a surface-protection statute.
312
  Whether that 
doctrine will become necessary or prove useful for lot owners in the 
Mountain Lakes subdivision remains to be seen.
313
 
D. Implications of Lesley’s Retroactive Ruling in the Shale Era 
1. Acquiring the Executive Right for Surface Protection: A Futile 
Proposition 
In its motion for rehearing, the developer urged the court to limit the 
ruling prospectively in light of public reliance on prior law, citing Moser 
                                                          
 309.  Id. at 491–92. 
 310.  Id. at 491 (“Following Manges, [the court held] that [the developer] breached its duty . . . 
by filing the restrictive covenants.”). 
 311.  Id. at 492. 
 312.  See generally ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL & GAS 
§ 2.1.B(2)(b) (2012) (“An unreasonable or excessive use of the surface will give the surface owner 
an action in damages or a right to an injunction.”).  The Texas case that established the 
accommodation doctrine is Getty Oil v. Jones. 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971) (“[W]here there is 
an existing use by the surface owner which would otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where 
under the established practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the [mineral-estate 
owner] whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of reasonable usage of the surface may 
require the adoption of an alternative by the lessee.”); see also Burney, A Pragmatic Approach, 
supra note 14, at 63 (discussing the Getty Oil approach and its consequences).  For a recent article 
arguing that Pennsylvania and other Marcellus shale states should adopt the accommodation 
doctrine, see Paige Anderson, Note, Reasonable Accommodation: Split Estates, Conservation 
Easements, and Drilling in the Marcellus Shale, 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 136, 140–41 (2013) (noting that 
in light of limited and ineffective legislation protecting surface rights, courts should adopt Texas’s 
version of the accommodation doctrine as set forth in Getty Oil). 
 313.  The Texas Supreme Court remanded the Lesley case for proceedings consistent with its 
rulings.  According to conversations with lawyers involved, the case has settled. 
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v. United States Steel Corporation.
314
  In that case, the court overruled 
the “surface destruction test” for interpreting the phrase “other minerals” 
in deeds, but restricted the ruling to deeds executed after the date of the 
opinion in light of public reliance on previous holdings and “an inability 
to foresee a coming change in the law.”315  The developer in Lesley noted 
that prior to the decision, acquiring the executive right as a surface-
protection measure had been literally text book law on which it had been 
entitled to rely: 
 
  It is also possible that the severance of the executive right has nothing 
to do with a desire to facilitate mineral development.  A purchaser who 
is primarily interested in surface use may insist upon acquiring the 
exclusive executive right to protect his surface investment.
316
 
 
The court, however, rejected the developer’s plea and overruled the 
motion for rehearing.  Therefore, because the court determined that 
surface owners could rely on the accommodation doctrine but not its 
deed restrictions, the developer’s purchase of the executive right in 1998 
proved ineffective for protecting its surface investment.  Since the 
opinion has retroactive effect, other surface owners in Texas, including 
ranchers and farmers and other developers, may find that their efforts to 
ensure surface protection—through deeds and wills that consolidated the 
executive right in one owner—were futile. 
2. Changing Bargains, Expanding Duties and Case-by-Case Results 
By striking the deed restrictions, the executives in Lesley argued the 
court had ignored their previous bargains, an approach at odds with other 
Texas Supreme Court opinions.
317
  Specifically, in disputes involving 
other oil patch transactions, particularly the oil and gas lease, the Texas 
Supreme Court has declined to rewrite parties’ bargains “to achieve what 
it believes to be a fair contract or to remedy an unwise or improvident 
                                                          
 314.  Motion for Rehearing, supra note 305, at 5 (citing Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 
99 (Tex. 1984)). 
 315.  Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103.  In another article I criticized the court’s opinion for the 
prospective ruling in Moser, arguing the public had not relied on cases establishing the “surface 
destruction test” since it required fact-finding and had changed over time.  Burney, Who’s On First, 
supra note 238, at 712–15. 
 316.  LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 602 (6th ed. 2008) (cited in 
Motion for Rehearing Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., supra note 305, at 3). 
 317.  Motion for Rehearing, supra note 305, at 3 (citing Moser, 676 S.W.2d 99). 
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contract.”318  Following this approach, the court of appeals in Lesley had 
concluded that the non-executives should be bound by their previous 
decision to sell their executive rights to a real estate developer.
319
  
Endorsing this view in an article written a year after Manges that 
criticized its use of the fiduciary label, Professor Ernest Smith opined as 
follows: 
 
  For example, in the context of an ordinary land sale, . . . where the 
grantee insists on the exclusive executive right in order to protect his 
surface estate, it seems highly unlikely that the parties expect the 
executive to act as a fiduciary. . . .  A grantee whose principal concern 
is surface use will pay a premium for the exclusive executive right.  If 
the grantor, who has retained a nonparticipating share of the mineral 
estate, can later insist that the executive power be used for his principal 
benefit, the intent of the transaction has been defeated and the grantor 
unjustly enriched.”
320
 
 
Yet in Lesley, rather than determine that the grantors–non-executives 
had been unjustly enriched, the court found the grantee–executive had 
breached its duty.
321
  Additionally, the court expanded executives’ duties 
by finding they exist prior to leasing and “may” include a duty to 
lease.
322
  Instead of providing general rules, the court expressly declined 
to do so because of “the widely differing circumstances.”323  This case-
by-case approach, which continues to include the fiduciary standard, 
ensures that non-executives will file lawsuits claiming executives have 
breached an enlarged and unpredictable list of duties.
324
  For drafting 
                                                          
 318.  See id. at 6 n.2; Burney, The Texas Supreme Court and Oil, supra note 273, at 259 (noting 
the court’s refusal to rewrite the oil and gas lease to benefit lessors by implying covenants); see also 
Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1941) (emphasizing that “the court 
should not read into the [lease] additional provisions unless this be necessary”).  See, e.g., HECI 
Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 889 (Tex. 1998).   
 319.  Veterans Land Bd. of Tex. v. Lesley, 281 S.W.3d 602, 625 (Tex. App. 2009) (stating that 
the non-executives should have understood the terms of the deed, and reversing the trial courts’ 
summary judgment entry to reform the deeds). 
 320.  Smith, supra note 274, at 373–74.  
 321.  While the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in Lesley notes that the developer had acquired 
the executive right to protect the subdivision from intrusive development, it does not examine the 
language in the 1998 deed that conveyed to the executive the “full, complete and sole right to 
execute oil, gas and minerals leases.”  Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 481–82 
(Tex. 2011). 
   322.   Id. at 483.  
 323.  Id. at 491. 
 324.  Recent cases reflect this fact.  See, e.g., Friddle v. Fisher, 378 S.W.3d 475, 478 (Tex. App. 
2012) (remanding the case back to the trial court for factual findings regarding duty owed by the 
executive to the non-participating royalty interest owners when the executive failed to distribute 
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future arrangements, in light of Lesley, parties should assess the burdens 
associated with executive rights before severing and acquiring them in 
the shale era.
325
 
 
VI. DEED REFORMATION V. INTERPRETATION: ANOTHER LESSON FROM 
LESLEY 
 
In addition to reversing the appellate court’s rulings regarding the 
executive duty in Lesley, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court’s 
ruling declining to reform the 1998 deed.  According to the grantors, the 
Lesleys, the parties intended to reserve a 1/4 mineral interest, not 1/8 as 
expressed in the deed.
326
  Because the language was clear, the grantors 
did not ask the court to interpret the deed
327—the process involved in 
resolving the perennial title issues discussed above.
328
  Instead, the 
                                                          
bonus payment); Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., L.L.C., 395 S.W.3d 348, 370 (detailing the duties owed 
by the executive right holder to non-participating royalty interests).  For the view that the court 
exercised “judicial foresight” in Lesley, see Christopher S. Kulander, The Executive Right to Lease 
Mineral Real Property in Texas Before and After Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 44 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 529, 571 (2013) (applauding court’s “foresight” in adopting a case-by-case approach 
but noting litigation will increase). 
 325.  Not all shale-era states will follow Lesley’s lead.  Louisiana has codified the executive duty 
and confined it to leasing transactions: “The owner of an executive interest is not obligated to grant a 
mineral lease, but in doing so, he must act in good faith and in the same manner as a reasonably 
prudent landowner or mineral servitude owner whose interest is not burdened by a nonexecutive 
interest.”  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:109 (1989).  Given the Texas Supreme Court’s pro-
development approach and its treatment of the parties’ previous bargain in Lesley, one wonders 
whether any document prohibiting leasing would be effective in Texas for lands burdened by non-
executive interests.  Instead, developers may have to decline to purchase the property or attempt to 
buy all of the minerals, an expensive proposition.  Other executives, such as parties buying or 
inheriting mineral interests burdened by pre-existing non-participating royalty interests, face the 
frustrating position of owing “fiduciary” duties to parties with whom they have had no interaction.  
See, e.g., Andretta v. West, 415 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. 1967) (imposing a fiduciary relationship 
between the successors in interest); Friddle, 378 S.W.3d at 482 (finding a fiduciary relationship 
although there was little to no interaction between the parties). 
 326.  The deed provided that the Lesleys reserved “one-fourth (1/4) of the oil, gas, sulphur and 
other minerals to which Grantors are now entitled to in all of the lands covered by this conveyance.”  
Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 484.  The Lesleys owned a 1/2 mineral interest, meaning they reserved 1/4 of 
that 1/2, or a 1/8 mineral interest.  Id. at 485. 
 327.  Id. at 485 n.24 (“Lesley does not contend for a favorable construction of the reservation 
according to its terms, taking into account the inconsistency she asserts.”). 
 328.  See generally supra Part II.B. 
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Lesleys sought to have the deed reformed to correct the mistake.
329
  This 
section discusses the differences between interpretation and reformation 
claims, and suggests that courts should strictly apply or reject the 
discovery rule in reformation suits in order to preserve the stability of 
land titles in the shale era. 
A. Statutes of Limitations: Applicable to Reformation But Irrelevant to 
Interpretation 
In interpretation disputes, parties seek legal clarification or 
declaration about the meaning of words in documents.  In reaching 
determinations, courts follow the rules of document interpretation 
discussed above, which aid in ascertaining the parties’ intent.330  
However, if a document contains a mistake, meaning one party claims it 
does not reflect the parties’ intent, the proper cause of action is 
reformation.
331
  Unlike claims seeking interpretation, reformation causes 
of action are subject to statutes of limitations designed to bar stale 
claims.
332
  A reformation claim becomes stale when too much time has 
passed, allowing memories and evidence about the mistake to fade, the 
classic reason justifying statutes of limitations in general.
333
  Such 
evidence is irrelevant in document interpretation claims, which involve 
competing views about the meaning of words, not allegations that words 
were mistakenly included or omitted.
334
 
 
                                                          
 329.  Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 485. 
 330.  See supra Part II.B. 
 331.  ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.10 (2009).  
 332.  See, e.g., Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 485–86; Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 943–44 (Tex. 
1980).  
 333.  As Justice Holmes explained, statutes of limitations serve the important purpose of 
“preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence 
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”  Order of R.R. Telegraphers 
v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944); see also Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, 
Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. 1996) (allowing the discovery rule to toll a statute of limitations but 
only where the injury is “inherently undiscoverable”). 
 334.  See Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 78 (explaining that when trying to 
ascertain the intent of the parties, it “is not the intent that the parties meant but failed to express, but 
the intention that is expressed”). 
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B. The Discovery Rule and Reformation: When Should Parties to a 
Deed Know About a Mistake? 
In Lesley, the alleged mistake occurred when the reservation in the 
deed referred to 1/4 of what the grantors owned; because grantors owned 
1/2, and the deed reserved a 1/8 mineral interest.
335
  According to the 
grantors, the reservation should have stated that they had reserved 1/4.
336
  
To correct that mistake, they sought to have the deed reformed.  The trial 
court granted this request but the court of appeals ruled it was barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations.
337
 
As the court of appeals explained, a reformation cause of action 
involves two elements: “(1) an original agreement and (2) a mutual 
mistake, made after the original agreement, in reducing the original 
agreement to writing.”338  In Texas, a four-year statute of limitations 
applies, but the discovery rule may toll that time period “until the party 
seeking reformation knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
should have known of the mistake in the deed.”339  Because the deed was 
executed in 1998, and the reformation claim was not filed until 2006, the 
statute of limitations would bar the Lesleys’ claim, unless the discovery 
rule applied.
340
 
1. Lesley Court of Appeals: No Discovery Rule—Parties Charged With 
Knowledge When Deed Was Executed 
The court of appeals in Lesley ruled that the discovery rule did not 
toll the four-year statute of limitations.
341
  In reaching that conclusion, 
the court noted the Lesleys “knew that they owned a one-half mineral 
interest before their conveyances to [the developer].  By reading the clear 
language . . . they would have known that they were reserving one-fourth 
of their one-half mineral interest.”342  Relying on a 1980 Texas Supreme 
Court decision, Brown v. Havard, the appellate court concluded that if 
there were mistakes, they “were ‘so plainly evident as to charge [the 
                                                          
 335.  Lesley, 352 S.W. 3d at 485. 
 336.  Id. 
 337.  Veterans Land Bd. of Tex. v. Lesley, 281 S.W.3d 602, 625 (Tex. App. 2009). 
 338.  Id. at 623 (citing Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 741 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. 1987)). 
 339.  Id. at 624 (citing Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. 1980)). 
 340.  Id. 
 341.  Id. at 625. 
 342.  Id. 
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Lesley Appellees] with the legal effect of the words used.’”343 
2. Lesley Texas Supreme Court: Discovery Rule Preserved Reformation 
Claim 
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals and 
held the discovery rule applied.
344
  In reaching its conclusion, the court 
focused on other language in the 1998 deed that reserved to the grantors 
1/4 of all bonuses and delay rentals, which the court noted is “twice the 
amount to which a one-eighth mineral interest would be entitled.”345  The 
court also pointed to subsequent conduct by the developer: the developer 
had described the reservation in the minerals as 1/4 rather than 1/8 in its 
own deeds to lot owners.
346
  Like the court of appeals, the supreme court 
relied on Brown v. Havard.
347
  That case involved a deed containing the 
double and restated fraction issues discussed above.
348
  In Lesley, the 
Texas Supreme Court admitted that the mistake in the 1998 deed was not 
“as opaque as the one in Brown,” but decided the discovery rule raised 
disputed fact issues affecting the reformation claim, and remanded it to 
the trial court.
349
 
3. An Argument in Support of a Restrictive Approach to the Discovery 
                                                          
 343.  Id. (citing Brown, 593 S.W.2d at 944). 
 344.  Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 486 (Tex. 2011) (noting that the 
statute of limitations question involves disputed facts instead of flat-out determining that the statute 
of limitations barred reformation). 
 345.  Id.  The deed had reserved 1/4 of the 1/2 of the minerals the grantors owned, which equals 
1/8, but continued to state that the grantors reserved 1/4 of bonus and delay rentals.  Id. 
 346.  Id.  In its motion for rehearing, the developer argued that the court’s reliance on subsequent 
conduct contradicted prior cases and destabilized land titles: “Now title examiners must review 
documents after the date the deed was executed to determine how later parties may have interpreted 
even unambiguous deeds, because that subsequent interpretation (even if wrong) can allow an earlier 
grantor or grantee to use the discovery rule to rewrite the deed.”  Motion for Rehearing, supra note 
305, at 12. 
 347.  See Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 485. 
 348.  Id. at 485–86.  The Browns had deed property reserving “an undivided one-half non-
participating royalty (Being equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16th) of all the oil, gas and other 
minerals. . . .” Brown, 593 S.W.2d at 940 (emphasis omitted).  Thirteen years later, the successor to 
the grantee, Havard, sued seeking interpretation in his favor or reformation.  Id. at 941.  The Texas 
Supreme Court held the discovery rule applied and a factual issue existed about when the grantee 
should have known about the mistake.  Id. at 944.  The dissent in Brown argued that reformation of 
the deed was barred by limitations and Havard was not entitled to reformation since he was on notice 
of what his deed contained.  Id. at 948 (McGee, J., dissenting). 
 349.  Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 485–86. 
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Rule for Reformation Claims: Title Stability in the Shale Era 
The Texas Supreme Court’s approach to the discovery rule in Lesley 
conflicts with the restrictive approach to the discovery rule it has adopted 
for other oil patch causes of action.  In particular, Texas opinions have 
declined to apply the discovery rule to causes of action that lessors assert 
against their lessees.
350
  Instead, the court has charged lessors with the 
burden to obtain knowledge about their lessees’ activities from a variety 
of sources, including public records for oil and gas documents.
351
  If 
lessors must take these affirmative steps to preserve causes of action 
under their oil and gas leases, courts should require grantors or grantees 
claiming reformation to read their deeds within the statutory time period 
after delivery.
352
 
                                                          
 350.  See, e.g., HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998) (noting that 
courts have tolled the statute of limitations where information was fraudulently concealed from a 
lessee). 
 351.  See, e.g., id.; Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex. 2011) (“Reasonable 
diligence requires that owners of property interests make themselves aware of relevant information 
[regarding royalties] available in the public record.”); Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 
S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2001) (noting that there are sources available from which royalty owners 
may obtain information about royalty calculations from their lessees); see also Samson Lone Star, 
Ltd. v. Hooks, 389 S.W.3d 409, 441–42 (Tex. App. 2012) (criticizing the supreme court’s approach 
to the discovery rule as applied to lessors). Justice Jim Sharp provided: 
 
 I reluctantly concur, based on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in BP America 
Production Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59 (Tex.2011).  In that case, the Texas Supreme 
Court makes clear that no lies on the part of a lessee, however self-serving and egregious, 
are sufficient to toll limitations, as long as it is technically possible for the lessor to have 
discovered the lie by resort to the Railroad Commission records.  This burden the Court 
imposes upon lessors is severe. It is now a lessor’s duty to presume that any statement 
made by its lessee is false and to ransack the esoteric and oft-changing records at the 
Railroad Commission to discover the truth or falsity of its lessee’s statements.  If, as is 
often the case, these records are technical in nature and require expert review to ferret out 
the truth, it is the lessor’s job to hire experts out of its own pocket to perform such a 
review.  If a lessor fails to take these steps, then it will have failed in exercising 
reasonable diligence to protect its mineral interests and, if the lessee’s fraud is successful 
for longer than the limitations period, the lessor’s claims will be barred by limitations.  
 
Id. 
 352.  This should at least be the case when the basis for reformation is mistake, rather than fraud 
or misrepresentation, which provide other grounds for challenging a deed.  Moreover, even if the 
statute of limitations does not bar the claim, or was not raised as a defense, parties must still meet 
their burden of proof.  See Arndt v. Maki, 813 N.W.2d 564, 572 (N.D. 2012) (affirming trial court 
ruling that evidence was insufficient to support reformation of 1984 deed that did not contain a 
mineral reservation); Van Berkom v. Cordonnier, 807 N.W.2d 802, 806 (N.D. 2011) (affirming trial 
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Shale era production may motivate grantors and grantees to review 
their deeds for mistakes as required for reformation claims.
353
  A liberal 
approach to the discovery rule potentially preserves and encourages these 
claims by allowing parties to ignore mistakes for years after deeds were 
executed.  The court of appeals’ approach in Lesley charges parties with 
knowledge they would have obtained had they read their deeds on the 
date of execution.  That approach reflects general views charging parties 
with knowledge about documents they sign.
354
  It also promotes title 
stability by preventing potential changes in ownership years after title 
examiners have based decisions on plain terms in the four-corners of 
deeds.  To promote title stability, courts should strictly apply statutes of 
limitations and limit the discovery rule for deed reformation claims in the 
shale era. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Along with oil and gas production, the shale-play booms guarantee a 
surge of oil and gas title disputes involving the perennial issues discussed 
above.  States with long histories of production and case law have 
grappled with several of these issues, providing answers for some and 
confusion regarding others.  In particular, executive-right owners may 
find that the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion in Lesley has burdened 
them with duties for which they had not bargained, and that owning that 
right provides no value as a surface-protection measure.  However, title  
examiners can take comfort in other Texas decisions that appear to have 
finally rejected the two-grant doctrine for interpreting conflicting 
                                                          
court ruling that evidence was insufficient to prove mineral reservation was mistakenly omitted from 
a 1995 warranty deed). 
 353.  For a recent case see Dupnik v. Hermis, involving land in the Eagle Ford shale in south 
Texas.  No. 04-12-00417-CV, 2013 WL 979199 (Tex. App. Mar. 13, 2013).  The issue in that case 
was whether a deed had reserved the minerals or conveyed the surface and the minerals to a 
described tract.  Id. at *1.  The deed described the land, but in the reservation section the word 
“none” appeared.  Id.  An exhibit, however, noted the property conveyed was “surface only.”  Id.  
Although the case confusingly focuses on whether the deed was void or voidable, and does not 
mention reformation, it rejects application of the discovery rule, finding the parties should have read 
their deed when it was executed.  Id. at *2–4. 
 354.  ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.10, at 
3–79 (2009) (“The most common defense to a suit for reformation is the statute of limitations . . . but 
there is often a dispute over when the statute began to run.  Of course the statute of limitations 
presumptively begins running immediately on the deed’s execution and delivery.  Because the 
parties to the deed are charged with knowledge of its contents, this presumption is virtually 
irrebutable if the deed clearly and obviously deviates from the parties’ agreement”). 
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fractions in multiclause deed forms.  Yet that state has not fully clarified 
how title examiners and courts should interpret deeds with double or 
restated fractions, which invariably are multiples of the usual 1/8 
landowner’s royalty.  As I argue, while that lease royalty is now more 
historic than usual, courts should incorporate an understanding of the 
legacy of that 1/8 royalty into the interpretation process.  That approach 
ensures results more consistent with the over-arching goal of deed 
interpretation: ascertaining the parties’ intent.  In addition to that 
interpretative goal, however, courts should adopt rules that promote 
another goal: title stability.  For example, the Texas approach to the 
mineral or royalty issue promotes that goal by according set meaning to 
the royalty and mineral labels, one that does not vary with outside 
evidence.  On the contrary, the Oklahoma approach allows the meaning 
of those words to vary depending upon whether a lease pre-dated the 
deed.  That approach complicates titles by requiring title examiners to 
review outside evidence and determine ownership on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Instead, in the shale era courts, should embrace the goal of ensuring 
title stability by rejecting rules that require scrutiny of extraneous 
evidence and that motivate strained interpretations.  For example, Kansas 
courts stretched for a mineral interpretation to avoid the application of 
the rule against perpetuities to non-participating royalty interests.  
Kansas courts should complete the process started in Rucker and declare 
that non-participating royalty interests—common oil-patch interests—are 
vested interests immune from the common law rule against perpetuities.  
Regarding the meaning of “minerals,” Pennsylvania acknowledged the 
extent of public reliance on the Dunham rule and reaffirmed it for 
Marcellus shale disputes in that state.  However, the rule retains rule of 
construction traits, which permits consideration of outside evidence 
regarding the parties’ intent.  Fortunately, the courts’ restrictive approach 
to the rule in practice, which confines interpretation disputes to the deed, 
should promote title stability.  Another lesson from Lesley regarding title 
stability is the value of a strict approach to the discovery rule in deed 
reformation actions, one that requires grantors and grantees to discover 
mistakes in their deeds within a state’s set statute of limitations period.  
In addition to providing guidance to courts, Lesley and other cases 
discussed in this article provide valuable drafting lessons about perennial 
issues in oil, gas and mineral deeds.  More lessons will follow as courts 
address the inevitable boom in title litigation spawned by the shale 
revolution. 
 
